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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the trends in
defense procurement during the Reagan presidency, with the
emphasis on California. In addition, those factors which
make up the general area of study termed the politics of
defense procurement will be examined to determine what role
they played in the award of defense dollars in California.
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I. THE INTENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Folklore says that California has benefited more than
any other state from the Reagan Administration's military
buildup:
California has received a huge share of the increased
military spending during the Ronald Reagan presidency, a
trend enhanced by the fact that Reagan and his defense
secretary, Casper Weinberger, are Californians. [Ref. 1]
More than any other state, California has benefited most
from the Reagan military buildup. [Ref. 2]
Statements such as these reflect the generally held
notion that California has been the primary beneficiary of
the increased defense spending that has resulted from the
Reagan Administration's military buildup. This notion, for
the most part, carries with it the presumption that the
reason California has benefited to such a large degree from
the military buildup is because Ronald Reagan is a
Californian.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the trends in
defense procurement during the Reagan presidency, with the
emphasis on California. In addition, those factors which
make up the general area of study termed defense politics
will be examined to determine what role they played in the
award of defense dollars to California.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
In order to begin this study, it is useful to have a
framework of questions from which to, first, build the
structure of the research and, secondly, provide some
direction for conclusions about the research. Therefore,
the following research questions were constructed:
- Has there been a significant increase in defense
contracts awarded to California's military contractors
since the Reagan Administration initiated its defense
buildup?
- If so, is this increase a function of various elements
of defense politics or the fact that California's huge
infrastructure of military contractors simply dwarfs
that of other states?
- Given the various roles that elements of defense
politics play in defense procurement, which ones have
significantly accounted for increases in the award of
contracts in California?
- How does California view this award of a large
percentage of the total defense contracts in the overall
picture of the state's economy?
In order to answer these questions, Chapter II of this
thesis will provide an historical background concerning the
role that various elements of defense politics have been
thought to play in defense procurement in the United States
since 1961. This background will consist of a composite
picture of defense politics in its various forms as it has
been studied and reported in the literature on the subject.
Chapter III of this thesis will examine the particular
defense political influences that have predominated in the
award of prime defense procurement contracts in California
during the Reagan presidency.
10
An analytical study will follow in Chapter IV. In this
chapter the intent will be to provide a quantitative
analysis of trends in the procurement process during the
years 1980 to 1986. Specifically, the following analysis of
data will be made:
- Annual dollar and percentage of total U.S. prime
contract awards for the five states receiving the
largest contract dollar awards
- Percentage change in contract awards, year-to-year, for
these top five states and other identified states with
the greatest percentage change
- The leading five states and their percentage
contribution in each of 2 5 major procurement programs
annually
- The top dollar awards to contractors by year.
Chapter V will be a review of how the state of
California perceives the large number of defense dollars
that flow through the state in the context of its economy;
this review is specific to the year 1986. And, finally,
Chapter VI will provide a summary and conclusions.
C. EXPLANATION FOR RESTRICTED SCOPE
The original intent of this thesis was not to be a case
study of California during the Reagan presidency. The
original idea was to examine the politics of military
procurement from about 1972 through 1986 for the nation as a
whole. The research question would be something to the
effect of, is military procurement a product of comparative
economic advantage or "pork barrel?" "Pork barrel"
politicking is the use of political power to award economic
11
gains to groups—states, companies, individuals—when they
have no technical advantage over other groups, and their
only criterion for getting the benefit is that they can
amass significant voting power. This is called "pork
barrel" politics. This is usually done by congressmen who
want to keep their home district happy so they will be re-
elected. Usually "pork barrel" politics involves a member
coalition so that a voting majority is formed when one group
gets one thing and another group something else, and their
combined weight is enough to pass the bill. Or it may be
attached as an amendment to a crucial bill in return for the
group's support on the main bill. The essence of the
definition of "pork barrel" politics is that it is
undeserved in terms of technical merit. A majority of the
literature on military procurement credits "pork barrel,"
the "military-industrial complex," or the "congressional-
industrial complex," with greatly influencing the
distribution of defense dollars; however, there is also a
body of research which questions the overall contribution of
these defense political influences. To answer the basic
research question against the backdrop of the controversial
literature on the subject, it would have been necessary to
gather some factual data and analyze it. The data that were
thought to be crucial to the study are state by state
defense spending and an idea of the size of each state's
industrial base and the percentage of this base dedicated to
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defense contract work. The state by state defense spending
information was readily available. The other half of the
data, specifically, defining the percentage of state
industrial bases accounted for by defense activity, proved
to be next to impossible to gather. It was the difficulties
in this endeavor that lead to the case study approach to
this thesis.
The first difficulty in attempting to gather information
on the size of each state's industrial base, potential
industrial base and percentage of the base involved in
defense contract work, is just getting a handle on the exact
form the data might take. A fairly good surrogate for this
data was assumed to be the percentage of a state's economy
which is accounted for by defense activity. (The premise
being that the larger the percentage of a state's economy
accounted for by defense activity, the greater the
probability that defense political influences would be in
evidence to ensure the continued flow of defense dollars.)
It would seem an easy task to find state GNP percentage
figures concerning the above; however, it proved otherwise.
The search for this information began in the Naval
Postgraduate School library. After some extensive searching
and endless querying of the research librarians, the
location of such information did not become obvious.
Therefore, the search took the form of backing into the
information from questioning experts in the field. The
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first step was a conversation with a columnist from the
Sacramento Bee . Dan Walters. He had written a column on the
huge share of military spending that California had received
during the Reagan presidency. In the column, he stated that
California's most important industry is military defense
[Ref. 1] . When asked whether or not he knew of a source for
the kind of data needed to answer the research question,
tailored at this point to California, he said there was a
real "vacuum" of information when it came to following
military spending in California. However, he was able to
provide the necessary key to finding the right department in
the California Legislature for the kind of information
needed. The Commission on State Finance produced a report
in August of 1986 called The Impact of Federal Expenditures
on California . The Commission was required by Assembly Bill
623 (Chapter 1027/85) to: (a) develop and maintain an
economic model capable of estimating the impact of certain
federal expenditures on California's economy; (b) project
federal expenditures coming into California, and (c)
estimate the impact of these expenditures on the state's
economy and on General Fund revenues [Ref. 3: p. 1], In the
middle of this report is a table which is entitled
"California Output Related to Defense Spending"—exactly the
kind of data needed. The report acknowledged Data
Resources, Inc. (DRI) , a Lexington, Massachusetts,
consulting firm that tracks defense spending, for the data
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used in conjunction with the Commission's econometric model
to produce the output estimates. Logically, the next step
was to contact DRI ; if they had the data for California, why
not for the rest of the U.S.?
After getting the assistance of several very capable
people at the various offices of DRI, it became evident that
the data used in the California report was gathered in
response to a special request from the state. A discussion
with the person responsible for assisting the Commission of
State finance in the San Francisco office revealed that
California was the first state mandated to compile such
information, and it was not available for other states as of
yet.
At that point, discussions with some of the faculty at
the Naval Postgraduate school led the search to the
Statistical Abstract of the United States . In this source,
a table presents defense purchases as a percentage of GNP.
The table's source is the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
The National Income and Product Accounts of the United
States 1929-1976 and Survey of Current Business .
Consequently, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis was
contacted. The idea was that defense purchases as a
percentage of total GNP had to be compiled from state
information. Unfortunately, that was not the case and
another dead end was reached.
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Numerous other attempts were made to find the data on a
nationwide basis similar to that available for California.
The general response was, "It seems like that kind of
information should be readily available." Given the time
limitations for the completion of this thesis, no further
resources were expended to complete an unequivocally
exhaustive search for the data to allow it to be said that
it does not exist; but a reasonably comprehensive and
methodical search was conducted to support the conclusion
that such data are too hard to find. Thus, this study
focuses on California and the exploration of the following
questions:
- Has there been a significant increase in the award of
DOD prime contract awards in California since the
initiation of the Reagan Administration's buildup?
- If so, is this increase a function of various elements
of defense politics or the fact that California's huge
infrastructure of military contractors simply dwarfs
that of other states?
- Which of the various elements of defense politics play
key roles in the award of prime contracts in California?
- And, finally, how does California view the impact of
these defense expenditures on the economy?
The next chapter of this thesis will provide a
chronological review of some of the significant academic
research articles and political commentaries written on





This chapter presents a chronological review of the
significant scholarly research and political commentary
publications on defense politics from the 1950s to the
present. The publications in the 1960s were basically
written as an acknowledgement of the existence of defense
political influence, primarily in the form of the "military-
industrial complex." In the 1970s, there was a
proliferation of articles, both commentaries and empirical
research studies, on elements of defense politics. And, in
the 1980s, the emphasis in the periodical literature has
been an examination of the element of defense politics with
the newly coined name, "congressional-industrial complex."
B. THE BEGINNING
There were rumblings in the late 1950s and early 1960s
that would lead to the recognition of the "military-
industrial complex" as a vital element of defense politics.
- According to Edwin Lahey, well-known Washington
Correspondent, "the Air Force . . . has a lobby stronger
than pig iron. The jaunty generals from the wild blue
yonder have more Senators and Congressmen in their
pockets than the Anti-Saloon League ever had at the peak
of its power." The reason is clear. Appropriations
granted the Air Force necessarily benefit the aircraft
industry; it is, in effect, the industry's lobby.
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It is the existence of this lobby, the most powerful
but least advertised in Washington, that raises a
question more serious than whether the industry's
profits are excessive. For it may be that we are
spending more for this type of defense than a realistic,
disinterested appraisal of the risks would indicate.
[Ref. 4:p. 603]
- It is by no means surprising but nevertheless worth
noting that the Senators who are the strongest advocates
of increased appropriations for military aircraft
represent states with burgeoning aircraft industries.
[Ref. 4:p. 604]
- Since the end of World War II many in the elite circles
have felt that economic prosperity in the U.S. is
immediately underpinned by the war economy and that
desperate economic—and so political
—
problems might
well arise should there be disarmament and genuine
peace. . . . Leading corporations profit from the
preparation of war. In so far as the corporate elite
are aware of their profit interests—and that is their
responsible business—they press for a continuation of
their sources of profit, which often means a
continuation of the preparation for war. [Ref. 5: p.
197]
Despite editorials such as these, the "military-
industrial complex" as a phrasal idiom and probably the most
predominant element of defense politics did not draw a good
deal of interest from other editorialists, journalists,
scholars and analysts until after President Eisenhower
coined the phrase in his farewell address in 1961. In his
speech, President Eisenhower spoke of the necessity of the
standing military establishment after World War II, but he
went on to warn against its potential power:
In the councils of government, we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or
unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power
exists and will persist. [Ref. 6:p. 797]
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Shortly after the President's address, Fred J. Cook
wrote an article for Nation entitled, "Juggernaut: The
Warfare State" [Ref. 7], which became the basis for his
manuscript, The Warfare State [Ref. 8]. Cook's- work is
repeatedly cited in the literature on the subject of the
"military-industrial complex." One of the primary reasons
for this could be attributed to the fact that he believed
that the above warnings of President Eisenhower had come to
fruition. Cook did not mince words in his description of
the situation; as he, himself, explained about the article:
The central theme was simply this: that the military
industrial complex had become so all-powerful that the
prosperity of the nation had become dependent on it, and
that the interests so intertwined had developed the power
to determine national policy and affect the nation's
destiny without regard to the will of the people. [Ref.
4:p. 602]
After Cook's article was published there seemed to be a
good deal of emphasis in the periodical and scholarly
literature of the time that focused on the "military-
industrial complex" in one way or another. The following
section cites some of those publications.
C. THE 1960S
In the 1960s the study of defense politics seemed to
center more on the geographic "where" of military defense
spending than on the "why" focus that Cook suggested. In
fact, D.S. Greenberg cited the distribution of defense
dollars as one argument against Cook's theory that the
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nation's economic welfare was undeniably linked to the
prospect of war. He said:
If we accept Cook's contention that defense spending is so
entrenched in American economic life, how do we account
for the fact that between the Korean War and July 1960,
Michigan's share of military prime contracts dropped from
9.5 to 2.7 percent. Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and
Wisconsin together had a total of 21.9 percent, which had
dropped to 9.1 percent. The nationwide total for defense
spending went up, of course, but these areas, which are
fully able to raise their voices in American politics,
have suffered the effects of what, from their standpoint,
might just have been a disarmament agreement. [Ref. 6: p.
798]
The impact of military procurement on the nation's
businesses, both in geographic and product mix terms, was
the focus of an interview with the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Comptroller, Charles J. Hitch, in September of 1962
[Ref. 9]. While Mr. Hitch predicted a trend in defense
procurement toward more research and development and fewer
production runs, he was certain that various defense
industries and geographic areas would continue to feel the
impact of defense production decisions on different weapons
systems:
I expect, however, that defense business will continue to
change rapidly in the character and mix of its products
and therefore, will continue to have an impact on
particular industries and on particular localities and
geographical areas. [Ref. 9: p. 30]
Judging from the answers to particular interview
questions, it would appear Mr. Hitch did not lend much
credence to the power of the "military-industrial complex."
He attributed the specific product mix of military defense
items to technological advance, changes in the international
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situation and changes in the nation's strategic plans [Ref.
9:p. 30] He explained the concentration of research and
development contract awards in California and the Eastern
seaboard as "natural":
I wish the concentration were a little less. I think it
is a natural concentration. The aircraft industry was
located in California and on the East Coast before World
War II, and that is where it has been ever since, with
some exceptions. Electronic instruments and other
supplies have in many cases developed around the aircraft
companies.
The aircraft companies naturally took over a fair
proportion of the missile business because they had the
people with the necessary skills. So I think that there
is a geographic concentration that is likely to change
slowly. Our policy is to let the contracts where we think
they can be carried out most efficiently. [Ref. 9:p. 102]
It was the recognition of this geographical
concentration that led the Department of Defense (DOD) to
actively seek geographic procurement diversity. In fact,
the DOD conducted seminars to help acquaint some areas of
the country with defense contracting criteria and promote
the dispersion of defense dollars. The Midwest was singled
out as the target of these seminars because Ohio, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin had, collectively, lost some
six billion dollars a year in government contracts after the
Korean War; their share of the military market had dropped
from 27 percent to 12 percent. The primary reason for this
drop was attributed to the states' failure to recognize the,
then, current interest in research and development in
military procurement; the missing element was cooperation
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between university and industry that would have helped to
spearhead research and development efforts. [Ref. 10: p. 16]
In the mid 1960s, it did appear as if the beliefs of Mr.
Hitch were valid. As he had attributed product selection to
technological advance, to changes in the international
situation and to changes in the nation's strategic plans,
procurement trends were closely aligned with the predominant
assumption that limited war in Vietnam, or elsewhere, was
the most likely threat from the period. [Ref. 11 :p. 69]
Therefore, the emphasis was on tactical requirements;
increased money was to be spent on ordnance, vehicles,
armaments, and spares. It was this emphasis that, perhaps,
served to upset the so-called power of the "military-
industrial complex."
The FY 1966 figures for the top 100 companies are unusual
in many respects, but most of the departures from previous
years can be traced to the war in Vietnam and the spread
of business to many smaller companies. [Ref. 12: p. 17]
D. THE 1970S
1. Overview
The 1970s were a period of contradictions for the
now widely understood defense political element known as the
"military-industrial complex." It was an unusual period
because while many scholars, columnists, politicians,
editorialists and the like were berating the power and the
resulting "atrocities" of the "military-industrial complex,"
others were providing quantitative and analytical studies
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which resulted in little empirical support for the strength
of political "military-industrial complex" ties. The
following section will review some of the more interesting
scholarly and empirical studies of the decade.
2 . Empirical Studies in the 1970s
Charles Wolf, Jr.
,
wrote an extensive paper which
challenged the power of the "military-industrial complex"
and provided empirical evidence to support his point [Ref.
13] .
In this paper, Wolf began by asking the questions:
- Is the "military-industrial complex" an obstacle to arms
control?
- If so, to what extent is it a threat? [Ref. 13 :p. 1]
Before he could provide an answer to these
questions, Wolf needed to construct a working definition of
the "military-industrial complex." The standard definition
of the "military-industrial complex" is " . . . the accepted
process by which other institutions—notably the military,
business, and government—work together to provide the
nation with the sinews of war" [Ref. 14:p. 1] . Wolf's own
view of the "military-industrial complex" is, in general,
somewhat more kind than the views of the time.
The reality of the MIC [military-industrial complex] is
complex not simple, pluralistic not monolithic, sometimes
effective and potent, sometimes ineffective and impotent,
no less motivated by concern for national interests than
its critics, nor less motivated by a mixture of other
motives than its critics. [Ref. 13 :p. 6]
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Wolf cited three empirical examples which he felt
revealed a more simplistic and monolithic view of the
"military-industrial complex" which was juxtaposed to the
complex and pluralistic view he favored. In the first
example, he presented three major public issues of the time
that would involve the "deepest interests and commitments"
[Ref. 13: p. 7] of the "military-industrial complex." He
then predicted the outcome of congressional voting based on
the simplistic view of the "military-industrial complex" to
explain the results. Wolf found that the Senate and the
House votes for public issues that would have easily been
influenced by the "military-industrial complex" were exactly
opposite as would have been predicted. The congressmen
voted against deployment of the ABM and developing the
supersonic transport and they voted for barring funds for
military operations in Cambodia. Table II-l summarizes this
study
.
The second example which Wolf presented, examined
the evidence of trends in defense budgets and expenditures.
He wrote that in constant 1961 dollars, defense expenditures
in FY 1971 were only 10 billion dollars more than they were
in 1961, with a strategic offense and defense force budget
at half of what it was in 1961 [Ref. 13:pp. 8-9].
Furthermore, he predicted FY 1972 defense outlays to be
substantially the same as those for FY 1971 [Ref. 13:p. 9].
Thus, while the level of defense expenditures in 1971 is
still extremely large, it represents the smallest
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percentage of total government expenditures and the
smallest percentage of GNP, that it has represented since
the start of the Korean War in 1950. Even more important,
the rates of change are negative and substantial. [Ref.
13:p. 9]
TABLE II -1
TABLE OF WOLF'S STUDY
Public Issues
1. The SAFEGUARD ABM deployment in 1969;
2. The Cooper-Church Amendment, barring funds for
military operations in Cambodia in June 1970; and
3
.
Appropriations for development of the supersonic
transport in December of 1970.
Predictions
It seems reasonable that one would have predicted . .
that the proportion of Senate and House votes in support of
the putative MIC position on each of these issues would have
been closely associated with the relative size of Defense
Department contracts by State. [Ref. 13 :p. 7]
Results
If one ranks the States in order of dollars of defense
contract awards per capita (for 1969) , and compares that
ranking with separate rankings of the States in accordance
with the percentage of their combined House and Senate
votes: (a) for the SAFEGUARD deployment; (b) against
Cooper-Church; and (c) for the SST appropriation, one finds
that the rank order correlation coefficients are -.12, .1
and .1, respectively. None of these correlation
coefficients is significantly different from 0! The results
provide no evidence of a relationship between defense
expenditures by States and Congressional voting, on these
key issues. [Ref. 13:pp. 7-8]
Wolf, finally, cited the General Accounting Office
(GAO) study on defense profits to support his view. The GAO
study concluded that defense contractors doing more than 10
25
percent of their business with the DOD did not have profit
margins that were significantly different than defense
contractors doing less than 10 percent of their business
with DOD.
The GAO study showed that profit rates, before Federal
income taxes, realized on equity capital investment (which
excludes facilities contributed by the government) was
almost exactly the same for 32 randomly selected large
defense contractors doing more than 10 percent of their
total business with the Defense Department as for 13
randomly selected large defense contractors doing less
than 10 percent of their total business with the Defense
Department. [Ref. 13: p. 10]
Wolf concludes that the data in these three examples
are inconsistent with the belief that the "military-
industrial complex" is a "powerful and effective obstacle to
limited arms expenditures" [Ref. 13:p. 9]. And, he further
wrote:
The difficulties and obstacles that lie in the way of arms
control are not governed, or in most cases heavily
influenced, by the military-industrial complex. The
problems are just hard and complex, and the constraints
often numerous and severe, quite apart from the putative
role of the MIC as an organized pressure group. To say
that the MIC prevents or hinders government action toward
controlling arms in these fields is both to exaggerate its
influence, and to underestimate the fundamental
complexities of the problems themselves. Slogans blaming
the MIC for our failure to move farther in the direction
of arms control not only do the military an unwarranted
disservice, but hinder rather than help in finding
solutions by diverting attention and effort from the real
problems. [Ref. 13:pp. 15-16]
A study that presents a completely different
viewpoint of defense political influences of the "military-
industrial complex" on weapon procurement was written by
James R. Kurth. Kurth ' s article revolved around questions
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regarding the nation's weapon policy; specifically, why some
weapons were purchased while others were not. He centered
his study on the aerospace industry in particular.
Does MIRV [Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle] , for
example, result from calculations about Russian threats,
or from reckless pursuit by weapons scientists and
military bureaucrats of technological progress for its own
sake, or from resourceful efforts by weapons manufacturers
and their allies in Congress to maintain production and
profits, or from some combination of these factors? [Ref.
15:p. 33]
Kurth set forth four broad explanation categories
for his question. They were:
- "strategic" explanations—favored by policy-makers and
officials and which were based on rational calculations
about foreign threats or measures to keep in step with
the arms race
- "bureaucratic" explanations—the outcomes of competition
between bureaucracies, in particular, the military
service
- "democratic" explanations—the outcomes of electoral
calculations by the President and the members of
Congress
- "economic" explanations—the results of the needs of the
capitalist system or, in a less sweeping formulation, as
the result of needs of particular corporations in the
aerospace industry. [Ref. 15: p. 34]
Kurth focused on the economic explanation in his
article, further defining the explanation as being composed
of two parts—the "follow-on" imperative and the "bail-out"
imperative. He described the "follow-on" imperative:
About the time a production line phases out production of
one major government contract, it phases in production of
a new one, usually within a year. In the case of new
aircraft, which usually require a development phase of
about three years, the production line normally is awarded
the contract for the new system about three years before
production of the old one is scheduled to phase out. In
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the case of new missiles, the development phase usually is
about two years. Further, in most cases, the new contract
is for a system which is structurally similar while
technically superior to the system being phased out, i.e.,
the new contract is a follow-on contract. [Ref. 15:pp.
38-40]
The reason for the "follow-on" imperative, in his
view, was simple. A large and established production line,
especially in the aerospace industry, was seen as a scarce
national resource to military officers, the managers,
shareholders, bankers, engineers and workers of a
corporation with a line, and the congressmen and senators
from the geographic area of such a corporation. The DOD was
especially interested in keeping this national resource
alive. [Ref. 15:p. 40]
To prove his point, Kurth examined nine corporations
and the patterns of phase-out/phase-in of military aerospace
systems. The results of this study are presented in Table
II-2. He did not, however, solely attribute his findings to
this "follow-on" imperative of the economic explanation. He
felt that political imperatives of the democratic
explanation were equally important.
Six of the production lines are located in states which
loom large in the Electoral College: California
(Lockheed-Missiles and Space, North American Rockwell, and
the Douglas division of McDonnell Douglas) , Texas (General
Dynamics and LTV Aerospace) , and New York (Grumman) . The
three others are located in states which in the late
1960 's had a senator who ranked high in the Senate Armed
Services Committee or Appropriations Committee:
Washington (Boeing; Henry Jackson) , Georgia (Lockheed-
Georgia; Richard Russell) , and Missouri (McDonnell


















































































The second strand of the economic explanation was
the "bail-out" imperative. Kurth reasoned, by way of a 12
corporation study of the annual income and employment
figures that corporations facing one of three difficulties
would be "bailed-out" by the U.S. government in the form of
an award of a new major military contract. The three
difficulties were: a drop in sales of close to 10 percent
or more from the previous year, a deficit in income and,
lastly, a drop in employment of 10 percent or more from the
previous year [Ref. 15:p. 42]. He concluded that DOD did,
in fact, "bail-out" five of the top eight defense
contractors presented in Table II-3. He did, however, feel
there was a stronger case for the "follow-on" imperative as
a general explanation [Ref. 15:p. 44].
The strength of Kurth' s explanations come, perhaps,
in this recognition of their limitations and applications.
First, a general point, the mere fact that a condition is
present does not in itself demonstrate that it is
important or salient in each of them. Alternative
explanations may be less general but more real. [Ref.
15:p. 47]
Kurth also acknowledges that his economic explanations and
imperatives may be overridden by other explanations but not
without a cost, most commonly in the form of another
contract award.
Strategic analysis and bureaucratic politics can enact a
cancellation, but when a dominant military organization
and a major aerospace corporation are involved,
bureaucratic politics and economic imperatives will also
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Finally, Kurth concluded that the alternative to
protecting these scarce national resources, known as
production lines, at any cost would be to convert aerospace
lines to non-aerospace lines (i.e., mass transportation and
waste disposal) , convert the military aerospace lines to
non-military aerospace lines and/or collapse the nine major
aerospace production lines into a smaller number [Ref. 15: p.
53] .
A study of the period which looked at the influences
on defense procurement from a little different perspective
than that of the "military-industrial complex" concentration
of Wolf and Kurth was Neil Heighberger • s study of
Congressional representatives' constituency influence on
defense policy-making; or as he called it, ethno-security
program decisions [Ref. 16].
In his study, Heighberger examined the trends in
roll-call votes in the 89th Congress on issues which
constituted the ethno-security domain in the House of
Representatives. He identified seven roll-call votes of
this type, and he assigned one of a five-point score of
ethno-security support to each representative [Ref. 16 :p.
226] :
Each representative then was assigned to an ethno-security
support score based on his voting record in the ethno-
security domain. The association between constitutency-
related characteristics and the representative's support
score is the critical relationship which will be analyzed.
[Ref. 16:p. 226]
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Heighberger examined four propositions that were drawn from
the literature of the day:
1. Southern representatives will tend to be stronger
supporters of ethno-security programs than will
representatives from any other section of the country.
2. Representatives with more rural constituencies will
tend to be stronger supporters of ethno-security





Representatives from districts which rank low in
social-economic status characteristics will tend to be
stronger supporters of ethno-security programs than
will representatives from districts which rank high in
these characteristics.
4 Representatives who represent districts which have a
high direct military impact will tend to be stronger
supporters of ethno-security programs than will
representatives who represent districts with a low
direct military impact. [Ref. 16:pp. 225-226]
Heighberger found support for his first two
propositions, but the last two propositions were not
supported. In the case of the last proposition he felt the
evidence was less than obvious:
The impact of direct military presence in the representa-
tive's district is ambiguous. Representatives from high
impact districts are clearly strong supporters, but so are
representatives from low impact districts—but to a lesser
degree. [Ref. 16:p. 234]
Stephen Cobb was responsible for several papers
which were basically akin to Heighberger ' s work. He found
little evidence to conclude that representatives from
districts highly dependent on defense spending were likely
to vote in favor of defense and foreign policies that could
potentially benefit their districts:
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. . . little support for the hypothesis that representa-
tives from districts highly dependent on defense spending
were more likely than representatives from nondependent
districts to vote for jingoistic foreign and defense
policies .... [Ref. 17:p. 163]
Cobb studied the House and the Senate in his works,
several of which were: "Defense Spending and Defense Voting
in the House: An Empirical Study of an Aspect of the
Military-Industrial Complex" [Ref. 17], "Defense Spending
and Foreign Policy in the House of Representatives" [Ref.
18], and "The United States Senate and the Impact of Defense
Spending Concentrations" [Ref. 19] . In each of these works
his findings were predominantly the same.
In his work on the Senate [Ref. 19], Cobb found that
between the years 1960 and 1967, all senators usually voted
in favor of defense spending. He attributed the inability
to correlate spending concentrations with voting for
increased spending to this fact [Ref. 19:p. 219]. He went
on to explain why Senators from states with small
concentrations of defense spending would also vote for
defense appropriations; he found that basically there had
been no reason not to vote dollars for defense:
There have been no strong forces opposing defense spending
since the Second World War. Under these circumstances,
there has been no strong reason to vote against defense
expenditures, since there was no political opposition to
punish pro-defense votes. On the other hand, there were a
series of factors which promoted pro-defense voting. All
Congressmen and Senators, including those from
nondependent areas of the nation, have been made aware of
the real and suspected dangers posed by other nations.
[Ref. 19:p. 220]
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However, Cobb was quick to point out that he did not expect
the situation to remain unchanged:
We would expect that as pressure grows against military
spending bills, either from other industries needing
funding or from the public on the basis of ideological
opposition, research opportunities in this area should
increase. Under such circumstances, any relationship
between Senate voting on defense appropriations and the
concentration of defense spending in a Senator's state
should be most apparent. [Ref. 19 :p. 220]
In Cobb's study on the House [Ref. 17], he found
much the same results; "... there is little support for
the hypothesis that defense spending concentrations affect
voting in the whole House" [Ref. 17:p. 180]. He attributed
this pattern to the similar reasons for the Senate's
behavior: representatives from districts with large concen-
trations of defense dollar contracts were under pressure
from their constituents, and the majority of the representa-
tives from districts without such large concentrations voted
with a bias toward the military view prevalent since World
War II. Again, there were no strong forces opposing votes
for defense expenditures [Ref. 17:p. 180]. Cobb did find
one exceptional group in his study. He found that there was
a correlation between defense spending concentrations and
voting among the very senior members.
. . . there is some indication that the relationship
exists, especially with regard to measures of defense
spending based on the military payroll, among the more
powerful senior members of that body. [Ref. 17 :p. 178]
Somewhat in contrast to the views expressed by the
authors above, Leo Lukenas presented an analysis of the
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budgetary behavior of the House Appropriations Committee on
defense procurement which was completely devoid of reference
to the influence of defense politics [Ref. 20].
The purpose of his thesis was described as follows:
At the outset, it was decided to attempt to characterize
the activity of the Subcommittee on Department of Defense
of the House Appropriations Committee on the basis of the
reasons given for its decisions on the individual line
item elements of the Defense Department Procurement
Appropriation. [Ref. 20:p. 21]
An underlying assumption in his work was that the Armed
Services Committees of Congress had a significant influence
on the appropriation and authorization process [Ref. 20: pp.
24-25]. He chose to look at the years FY 1970-FY 1973.
Each of the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the
House Appropriations Committee decisions was placed into one




a. improper category—i.e., RDT&E vice O&M
b. premature request— i.e., testing on the
procurement item was not complete, deficiencies
were not corrected, full evaluations were
necessary, there was an excessive concurrency
between development and procurement
c. reductions due to cuts in related programs
d. insufficient priority/urgency— i.e., costs cannot
be justified or made a part of budget amendments
but were of insufficient urgency to warrant
amendment action
2. service adjustment— i.e., cancellation of
requirements, termination of contracts, deferral of
procurement, program realignment, awarding of multi-
year contracts, use of current assets in place of new
procurement
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3. reduced requirement— i.e., the difference between the
current actual usage and attrition rates and those
used by the services in forecasting requirements
during budget preparation
4. financial adjustment— i.e., reductions recommended by
the Subcommittee, but immediately offset by the
transfer of prior year unobligated funds or the
transfer of funds from the Defense or Service Stock
Funds
5. special Subcommittee action
a. general reduction—i.e., imposing reductions of a
non-specific nature which were absorbed as the
affected services saw fit
b. reversal of authorization decisions— i.e.,
nullifying the addition or deletion of funding
approved during the authorization process and
appropriating just what had been requested by the
services
6. no reason cited
7. conformance with authorization. [Ref. 20:pp. 25-27]
The results of his study were fairly straightfor-
ward. The majority of the decisions made by the
Subcommittee fell into the "improper request" decision
category. And in the "improper request" decision category
the reason cited most often for action was a "premature
request." According to Lukenas,
These decisions reflected Subcommittee interest in program
progress. ... In such instances, the size of the
funding request appeared to be secondary to the desire to
avoid excessive concurrency between development and
production. On a consistent basis, more decisions were
made each year in response to items in the "premature
request" category than any other category. . . . [Ref.
20:pp. 32,34]
Towards the end of the 1970s an explanation of the
defense expenditure policy-making process became a target of
37
study as an interest in organizational decision-making and
policy-making developed. In the article by Charles W.
Ostrom, Jr., "A Reactive Linkage Model of the U.S.
Expenditure Policymaking Process" [Ref. 21], a flow diagram
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Figure 1. Ostrom' s Reactive Linkage Model
In Ostrom' s model the international environment, together
with the domestic environment, act on the policy-making
process. As he further explains:
The adoption of a reactive linkage orientation suggests a
way in which the domestic and international environments
can be combined with the organizational decision-making
process. The initial policy-making rule (i.e., services'
request for funds) can be viewed as a reaction to the
changing conditions in the international and the domestic
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environments which is then filtered through the remaining
organizations (i.e., President, Congress, Department of
Defense) to determine the magnitude, scale, and timing of
the reaction. [Ref. 21:p. 943]
3 . Political Commentary in the 1970s
One of the most interesting articles from the early
1970s on defense expenditures was written by a
Representative from the House, Les Aspin. The article he
wrote was concerned primarily with the inability of Congress
to control military spending during this time period, and
the reasons for the phenomenon.
There are, of course, any number of reasons why Congress
is so pathetically inept at controlling military spending
At the top of the list, according to the conventional
knowledge, are outworn cold war ideologies, the political
might of the weapons industries and Armed Services
Committees, whose senior members, for the most part, seem
to be under the influence of both. [Ref. 22 :p. 81]
Representative Aspin wrote that had the House Committee on
Armed Services been a more demanding body, the right kind of
issues would have been heard and the right kind of
information presented in Congress to permit more knowledge-
able decisions allowing for a more controlled defense
budget. His criticism of the Armed Services Committee
centered on who was on the Committee and for what reasons.
Aspin suggests that congressmen from areas with a large
concentration of defense contractors desire positions on the
Armed Services Committee so that they may better serve their
constituents
.
When a congressman first gets elected, one of the things
he immediately starts thinking about is how to get re-
elected. That is, after all, what politics is all about.
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To get re-elected, especially for a junior member with no
chance to pass important legislation, constituent service
is important. What this means is that if the congressman
comes from a area in which a big defense contractor is a
major employer, it helps to be on the Armed Services
Committee. So junior congressmen with defense
constituents aim for the Armed Services Committee (later
they acquire too much seniority to change) , and as a
result the Committee is top-heavy with congressmen who are
constituency-oriented on defense. [Ref. 22: pp. 89-90]
He believed that this constituency-oriented
membership partially explained why there were generally only
10 percent of the votes in Committees for amendments to cut
the defense budget as opposed to 2 5 to 3 percent of the
votes when the amendments were brought to the House floor
[Ref. 22:p. 90].
Beyond the concern for maintaining defense budgets
at relatively high dollar levels, Representative Aspin felt
the congressman ' s only other concern was where the money
would be spent.
. . . the Armed Services Committee is typically less
concerned about the question of how much we buying in
defense than the question of where we are buying it. The
Committee is less concerned about how many DD-963
destroyers the Navy should build, for example, than about
who will build them. [Ref. 22 :p. 91]
In the conclusion to his article, Aspin petitioned
for changes that would allow for the military spending to be
brought under control, and he cited some examples of initial
changes already in place. In particular, he wrote that the
defense budget was no longer thought of as an entity not to
be tampered with by Congress. Testimony by witnesses
arguing for a reduction in defense spending was being heard
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before the Committee on Armed Services and dissent was more
tolerated on the Committee [Ref. 22:p. 91]. Representative
Aspin predicted more changes as money became more of a
precious resource to be carefully conserved:
As money becomes scarcer for domestic programs, prices
continue to rise and high taxes continue to be unpopular,
people are bound to start looking at a bloated defense
appropriation and wonder why. Why, for example, is the
military asking for more money, not less, not that we're
out of Vietnam? Why, especially after the SALT
agreements, should the military get the peace dividend
instead of the taxpayer?
If Constituents start asking these questions, it won't
be long before congressmen, even those on the House Armed
Services Committee, will start getting the message. And
through this they may come to believe that their
constituency is really much broader than just the defense
industries. So the hope for change, I believe, lies in
the very impulse that until now has kept the Armed
Services Committee a preserve of the military-industrial
complex: that is, the wholly natural, self-interested
desire of politicians to serve their constituents. And
when that change occurs, one of the first things on
Congress' agenda will be to stop playing along with the
games the Pentagon plays. [Ref. 22: p. 92]
Whereas, Aspin 's view of the "military-industrial
complex" centered around the fact that its influence on
congressmen exacerbated their inability to control military
spending, other writers in the mid- to late-1970s had a
different impression of the influence of the "military-
industrial complex." The impact of the "military-industrial
complex" on national industry and employment became the
focus. Douglas Mattern wrote in "The Economics of Death"
[Ref. 23] that the potential kill capacity of the nation was
well beyond what could ever be conceivably used. He
questioned the reasoning behind this phenomenon, "... why
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produce more overkill when our capacity is already rated at
some 3 0-4 times every human being on this planet?" [Ref.
23: p. 32] His answer was based on political and economic
reasons.
Politically, he wrote that "... the patriots
desperately want to have one more warhead than the Russians
in the pathetic illusions that this makes us number one"
[Ref. 23: p. 32]. He was adamantly opposed to the Secretary
of Defense James Schlesinger • s view at the time that
armaments must be increased to have disarmament become a
reality. In Mattern's words, "armaments are big business"
[Ref. 23:p. 32].
This statement paved the way for his economic
reasoning for an overkill capacity in the nation's
armaments. He wrote that while Administration officials
contended that arms trade and armaments were essential to
national industry, to the U.S. balance of payments and to
jobs, the crime was in the high profits the defense
contractors were making [Ref. 23:pp. 22-23].
Corporations must be exposed for the huge profits they
derive from military contracts, and this includes the
obscene policy of planned weapons' obsolescence and
modification to insure the contracts keep coming in
without pause. [Ref. 23: p. 33]
An equally vehement critic of the power of the
"military-industrial complex" would appear to have been
Norman Cousins. He cited two studies in his article "Jobs
and Military Spending" [Ref. 24] which more or less refute
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the generally held belief that "... the national economy,
especially on the employment level, profited from the
manufacture of armaments and the maintenance of the armed
forces." [Ref. 24:p. 49]
In his review of the work of Bruce Russett and of
Marion Anderson, Cousins summarizes the findings of both
researchers:
1. military labor is less productive and economical than
civilian labor
2. greater amounts of military money go to produce the
same quantity and quality of goods that civilian
dollars produce
3. a good deal of military money is not translated into
employment; it goes toward weapon maintenance and
supporting high salary supervisory personnel. [Ref.
24:p. 49]
He concludes the article:
Yet one of the main arguments for maintaining and
enlarging the arsenals is that their reduction or
limitation would trigger an unacceptable loss of jobs.
Even if true, this is monstrously wicked reasoning; and
the fact that the American Federation of Labor and some of
our more lustrous names in Congress are identified with
such reasoning makes it no less reprehensible. [Ref.
24:p. 49]
As the 1970s came to a close, a new phrase was
coined and a new concern was voiced:
"People used to worry about the power of the military-
industrial complex," says a retired admiral who currently
works as an aerospace industry consultant. He is
referring to President Eisenhower's warning that
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businessmen and soldiers have an interest in dreaming up
new weapons that keep defense spending high. But now, he
says, "the congressional-industrial complex" frequently
has a greater influence on boosting spending for more
arms, particularly aircraft. [Ref. 25]
As reported by Kenneth H. Bacon for the Wall Street
Journal, in his article "The Congressional-Industrial
Complex," the reason for the change from the "military-
industrial complex" to "congressional-industrial complex"
stemmed primarily from the change in the 197 0s of military
procurement patterns, stricter Pentagon policies regarding
contractor/military official relationships, the recognition
that Congress was taking a growing role in setting defense
and foreign policy, and the fact the Pentagon budget had
diminished. He warned that an equally watchful guard should
be kept on the "congressional-industrial complex" as
President Eisenhower advised for the "military-industrial
complex." [Ref. 25] This new defense political element,
the "congressional-industrial complex," would be the focus
of study in the coming decade.
E. THE 1980S
The 1970s brought to the 1980s a changed congressional
body. Before this time, little was done about the defense
budget by Congress.
When evaluating civilian agency requests, Congress
—
especially through its committees—has historically
exhibited a sense of sureness and aggressiveness not
replicated by its defense budget behavior. A variety of
factors have traditionally served to undermine the
congressional will to act in the defense sector, among
which are self-perceived lack of expertise, the lack of a
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critical link between the defense issue being discussed
and the congressman's constituency, and a generalized fear
of being "soft" on national security. For whatever
reason, congressional impact upon the defense budget has
historically been minimal. [Ref. 26:p. 415]
In the 1970s there was a shift to more critical
attention to the military budget. Robert L. Bledsoe and
Roger Handberg, in their article, "Changing Times: Congress
and Defense," felt that this focusing of attention on the
defense budget was due to two reasons, one, that there was
now greater congressional staffing and that staffs were more
professional, and, two, that the defense budget may have
become the only component of the total budget that remained
"controllable" by Congress. [Ref. 26:pp. 425-426] This
shift is interesting in that it suggests that given the
increase in focus on the military budget by Congress, the
potential impact of the "congressional-industrial complex"
becomes staggering.
This idea of Congress changing in the 1970s to become
somehow different in the 1980s is reiterated by Roger H.
Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek in their book, Congress and
Its Members [Ref. 27]. They, however, view the reason for
the change a little differently:
Today's independence and deference to electoral
considerations is embodied in then-Representative Phil
Gramm's declaration: "I'm gonna' dance with them that
brung me"—meaning his voters back home. [Ref. 27 :p. 377]
In their book, Davidson and Oleszek review many of the
determinants of congressional voting, all or none of which
could determine congressional voting on foreign and defense
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policies and budgeting. The determinants as they describe
them are:
1. the party— " . . . the institutional push toward
partisan voting cannot be ignored." [Ref. 27 :p. 391]
2. the constituency—"While the impact of the
constituency upon individual decision making has been
studied extensively, the conclusions from those
studies are not altogether clear." [Ref. 27 :p. 391]
3
.
ideologies—many congressmen and senators do vote
ideologically [Ref. 27:p. 391]
4. the presidency— "In many areas of policy making,
Congress responds to presidential leadership.
Although Congress often pursues an independent course
and few members feel a deep loyalty to the occupant of
the White House, incumbent presidents do influence
decisions reached by individual senators and
representatives." [Ref. 27 :p. 395]
Basically, there are three factors that the authors found
that influence the correlation between the presidency and
congressional voting. First, they asserted that modern
presidents achieve at least half of their legislative
objectives. Second, partisan swings will affect the
influence of the president. And, finally, third, that
presidents tend to lose congressional support as their
Administrations age. [Ref. 27 :p. 395]
Davidson and Oleszek further presented a review of other
studies which put forth various ideas as to determinants and
cues to congressional voting. Some of the cues were party
leaders, committee chairmen, and fellow members. [Ref.
27: pp. 396-397] The final determinant in the arena of
congressional voting that they pointed out was "logrolling";
they defined the term as
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. . . a bargaining strategy in which the parties trade off
support so that each may gain its goal. In its most
visible form, trading is embodied in a something-for-
everyone enactment—known as "pork barrel". . . . [Ref.
27:p. 399]
An article written for Time magazine, "Weapons That
Refuse To Die," by Ed Magnuson, is probably the best
illustration of the voting behavior of Congress in the 1980s
[Ref. 28]. In his article Magnuson states, "A Congressman's
drive to protect his home turf often saves weapons that
ought to fade away." [Ref. 28 :p. 15] And further,
The process again illustrated how hard it is to kill
hugely expensive systems once they have established a
toehold. Almost every new weapons proposal gets quick
Capital Hill approval for research and development, since
this seed money is fairly small. After that, it is
virtually impossible to stop, no matter how high the costs
soar above original estimates. "Once a system nears the
production stage it's too late," says Maine's Republican
Senator William Cohen. "There's such a constituency of
the Pentagon, the contractors and potential job holders
that no democratically elected Congress can say no."
[Ref. 28:p. 15]
F. SUMMARY
This review of some of the literature written on the
influence of defense politics in the area of defense
procurement and/or expenditures is not intended to be viewed
as all-encompassing or definitive. It is simply the intent
to provide a sampling of the more varied and interesting
writings on the subject.
Naturally, most all of the views and studies presented
in this review have counterpart views and studies, some in
concurrence and some in opposition. For example, Arnold
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Kanter and Stuart Thorson developed an alternative theory of
weapons procurement in their article, "The Weapons
Procurement Process: Choosing Among Competing Theories"
[Ref. 29], to the theory of the "follow-on" and "bail-out"
imperatives put forth by Kurth reviewed here. They propose
a weapons procurement theory which simply states:
The more heavily a project can be committed in the early
periods of research and development, the greater the
probability of its subsequent production and deployment.
[Ref. 5:p. 12]
Similarly, Stephen Cobb's findings in his studies were
inconsistent with the studies by Gray and Gregory, "Military
Spending and Senate Voting" [Ref. 30], and by Bruce Russett,
What Price Vigilance [Ref. 31] . The findings of Gray and
Gregory and Russett
. . . have found small but statistically significant
correlations between defense spending concentrations and
voting in the Senate on some but not other clusters of
complex-related issues. [Ref. 5: p. 14]
Beyond providing a sampling of the writings on the
subject of the defense politics, the purpose of this chapter
has been to provide a backdrop to study the influences on
defense procurement during the Reagan Administration.
Specifically, the following questions would naturally seem
to arise after contemplating the foregoing literature
review:
1. Is the prosperity of the nation, in particular
California, dependent on the might of the "military-
industrial complex," as Cook suggests?
2. Are the defense procurement dollars spent in
geographic locations where the industries are located
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as the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Charles J.
Hitch, suggested?
3. Do the shifts in strategic plans and the ever-changing
international situation dictate the product mix of
defense procurement?
4. Does the "military-industrial complex" hinder arms
control, as denied by Charles Wolf, Jr.?
5. Have the "follow-on" and "bail-out" imperatives, as
developed by Kurth, been operating during the Reagan
Administration?
6. Has the impact of direct military presence in the
districts of the House representatives been more or




Has the make-up of the Armed Services Committees been
more or less peopled with a defense contract
constituency-oriented membership during the Reagan
Administration? If so, how has the membership
impacted on the votes in Committee?
8. Have the votes of the senior members of Congress
correlated to concentrations of defense spending
during the Reagan Administration as Cobb found in
earlier years?
9. Has there been an institutional push towards partisan
voting on defense procurement issues during the Reagan
Administration, as Davidson and Oleszek suggest?
Certainly not all of these questions can be answered in
this case study, the best that can be gained from the study
of the time period of the Reagan Administration is a
revelation of trends in defense -procurement that might
somehow be linked back to one or more of the defense
political influences described here.
The following chapter will discuss the Reagan rearmament
plan and the presence of defense political influences during
the Reagan Administration in six specific instances.
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III. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION REARMAMENT PLAN AND
DEFENSE POLITICS
A. THE SUPPORT
The time was obviously right, for there could be no
other explanation for the widespread support that President
Reagan garnered for his plan to build up the military forces
with never-before-seen dollar expenditures in a time of
peace. The predisposition of the American public to accept
this massive rearmament plan was traced easily to the
current events of the day.
The year 1980 was one of perceived national security
crisis by the American public. The country had
experienced a series of defense and foreign policy shocks.
The Iranian revolutionaries held fifty Americans captive
in the embassy in Teheran; Americans were witness to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the nightly news; Soviet
combat troops were discovered in Cuba; the ratification of
the SALT II treaty, designed to limit the strategic
arsenals between the United States and the Soviet Union
had been postponed by Congress and the Carter
administration. Moreover, it was an election year and the
Republicans were advocating significant increases in
annual defense expenditures for the coming years. [Ref.
32:p. 8]
The fact that the plan was not questioned more by the
public was a curious phenomenon to many policy-makers,
economists, editorialists and journalists; after all, it was
the largest military buildup in peacetime history.
Yet for all its revolutionary impact, the massive defense
buildup planned by the Reagan Administration—the largest
peacetime rearmament since World War II—has so far drawn
little dissent. [Ref. 33:p. 28]
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In his thesis, A Review of the Debate Concerning the Reagan
Administration's Increase in Defense Spending [Ref. 32],
Howard Couch cited two surveys which help to quantify the
amount of support the Reagan Administration would enjoy once
elected into place by the majority of voters. A survey
conducted in the early months of 198 by NBC News and the
Associated Press found that 55-74 percent of the public
surveyed favored increased defense spending, while only 5-13
percent favored decreased spending. What makes this survey
particularly interesting is the fact that the same poll in
1978 had found 2 6 percent of those surveyed favored defense
increases and 51 percent wanted defense decreases.
Similarly, a poll conducted by the National Opinion Research
Center in 1980 found 60 percent of those surveyed felt too
little was being spent on national defense compared to the
results of the same poll conducted in 1973 and 1978 when 12
percent and 2 9 percent, respectively, of those surveyed felt
too little money was being spent on defense. [Ref. 32: pp.
8-9]
Months after the election and into his first term as
President, Reagan's rearmament expenditures were still
viewed by the American public as a good thing. Newsweek
conducted a survey in 1981 which found that 64 percent of
the American public approved of increased defense spending,
54 percent expressed a desire that the U.S. establish a
clear military superiority over the U.S.S.R. and 48 percent
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of the American public believed that the Reagan
Administration had developed an effective defense policy.
[Ref. 33:p. 29]
Naturally, and perhaps more understandable than its
support from the general public, the Reagan Administration's
rearmament plan drew support from the powerful "military-
industrial complex" and the "congressional-industrial
complex." Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers wrote extensively
about this backing for Nation [Ref. 34]. They felt that the
Administration drew supporters from internationally
competitive industries and the declining domestic industrial
sectors because they would have had the most to gain from
the buildup, or the "fortress mentality" of the Administra-
tion [Ref. 34:p. 439]. Ferguson and Rogers also wrote about
individual supporters, and the implication is clear that
these backers were serving their own interests:
Prototypical of Reagan's early foreign policy supporters
was retired admiral and former Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman Thomas Moorer, a walking incarnation of the
military industrial complex who currently serves as a
director of Texaco, Fairchild, Alabama Drydock and
Shipbuilding, United Services Life Insurance, the U.S.
Strategic Institute and the Retired Officers Association,
advisor to the Admiral Nimitz Foundation and president of
the Association of Naval Aviation. . . . Other prominent
and typical early supporters included issues advisor Edwin
Meese, who is a former vice president of aircraft parts
supplier Rohr Industries, and Donald Rumsfeld, who served
as NATO ambassador under Richard Nixon and Secretary of
Defense under Gerald Ford and is currently president of
G.D. Searle and Company, a RAND trustee and a director of
several corporations, including Bendix. [Ref. 34 :p. 439]
This widespread support was threatening to some critics
of the rapid growth in expenditures. Gordon Adams, in the
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article he wrote for The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists [Ref.
35], expressed the fear that such extensive backing would
limit the opportunity for debate and lead to "rubber-
stamping" defense expenditures:
It has been difficult to reverse the tide of military
spending buildup. It is especially difficult to broaden
the debate over the meaning of national security by
introducing perspectives differing from those of
individuals and institutions that have made national
security and defense procurement policies since 1945. The
"iron triangle" of defense policy—that historic
relationship linking the Defense Department to its
Congressional supporters and the defense industry—has
dominated the debate, sharing information, policy access
and influence and defending itself from outsiders and
alternatives. [Ref. 35:p. 8]
However, this was not to be the case during the Reagan
Administration. A large part of the debate was waged by
leading policy-makers and economists. More than not, the
debate surrounded questions concerning, first, the lack of
strategy and defined goals in the buildup [Ref. 36:p. 30],
and, secondly, the role that increased defense spending
would have on the economy, social program expenditures and
the federal deficits [Ref. 32:p. 9]. The following section
will describe these two facets of the debate.
B. THE DEBATE
Time and time again, the critics of the Reagan
rearmament plan cited its lack of a clear strategy or a
defined goal as its major character defect. Strategies or




. . the buildup is going ahead without any clear
strategy—except to send a signal of American resolve to
the Soviet Union" [Ref. 33:p. 28].
- "
. . . money throwing at defense with little strategy or
defined goals" [Ref. 36:p. 30].
- "We've got a national military strategy called M-O-R-E,"
challenges defense specialist John Collins of the
Congressional Research Service. "We have a request for
$1.5 trillion over the next five years with no policy
behind it." [Ref. 36:p. 30]
- That approach [the strategy of M-O-R-E] shows in the
line items in the Reagan defense budget, which are
mostly expanded versions of programs and procurement
policies endorsed by the Carter Administration. And a
close look shows that many of them are ill-served to
achieve the ambitious goals described by Weinberger.
Most military experts agree , for instance, that there is
a desperate need for lighter, simpler and more mobile
equipment than the United States now has in its arsenal,
if conventional forces are to be deployed rapidly around
the globe. Yet much of the stepped-up spending is
destined for heavier and even more complex munition such
as "big deck" aircraft carriers and massive M-l tanks.
[Ref. 36:p. 30]
This rather dim view of the Reagan rearmament strategy
is somewhat surprising in that the Administration formed a
defense transition team to help prepare for the buildup.
The team leader, William R. Van Cleeve, and his deputy, Ben
T. Plymade, had worked in the private sector in the area of
strategic weapon systems before coming to the team, and they
adamantly voiced that the team was not a "policy-making unit
. . . seeking to force their concepts of weapons systems and
programs on the services" [Ref. 37:p. 16]. Van Cleeve
explained the team's charter as simply to help turn the
military around; specifically:
If we have any general direction at all, it isn't so much
in terms of specific programs or solutions; it's in terms
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of what we feel is the major problem
—
getting us out of
the mess our military is in as rapidly as we can. [Ref.
37:p. 16]
The "mess" that Mr. Van Cleeve was generally referring
to is the fact that the U.S. had fallen behind the U.S.S.R.
in the arms race, as the Soviets had continued to build up
conventional and nuclear war capabilities while the U.S. had
stagnated in its military pursuits, and in some instances
actually regressed. As President Reagan noted upon assuming
office in January of 1981; the military was in poor shape:
I was appalled by what I found: American planes that
couldn't fly and American ships that couldn't sail for
lack of spare parts and trained personnel and insufficient
fuel and ammunition for essential training. The
inevitable result of all this was poor morale in our Armed
Forces, and difficulty in convincing our most experienced
military personnel to stay on. [Ref. 32 :p. 35]
The idea was to have the team start with a "clean
sheet," determining what the defense needs were without
regard to costs. The services were asked to provide
responses to issue papers provided by the transition team.
This was not a flawless procedure in that there were
problems with the services' replying to the issue papers:
The services are so used to being forced into programs
they have not sought and having to take funds from other
programs they want and need to pay for them that they are
leery about supporting some of the new Administration's
programs "until they can see the money for them on the
table," one top-level Pentagon official said. [Ref. 37 :p.
18]
Needless to say, a defense plan was developed and
budgeted for use by the Reagan Administration:
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The blueprint being used for the Reagan budget is a
defense plan drawn up by a bipartisan group of
congressional staff members working mostly in the areas of
national security and foreign policy. [Ref. 38 :p. 14]
All planning had been based on the idea that the U.S. would
have to deal with a major confrontation with the U.S.S.R.
and possibly a "brushfire" in the Third World. Now, the
plans called for a multi-front confrontation with the
Soviets in Europe and the Persian Gulf. Caspar Weinberger,
the Secretary of Defense, believed in a strategy which
planned for two and one half long conventional wars. [Ref.
33:pp. 29,31] Plans were to bolster the conventional
forces, stress the development of a Rapid Deployment Force
and leave the American nuclear strategy intact [Ref. 36: p.
30] . The top priorities were to protect Europe and Northern
Asia and to begin to deal with the new strategic zone in the
Persian Gulf [Ref. 36:p. 39]. In terms of numbers, the
Administration was looking to build four new Army divisions,
150 new ships and five more Air Force wings. The overriding
theme was simply "... not just to deter Soviet aggression
but to defeat it" [Ref. 33 :p. 29].
According to Deputy Defense Secretary Carlucci, the Reagan
Administration hopes that once the world recognizes that
America intends to forge real new military strength,
friends will be "more inclined to work with us and stand
up and be counted" and enemies will "think twice about
doing things which fundamentally undermine Western
interests." [Ref. 36 :p. 39]
The second aspect of the defense buildup that sparked
considerable controversy was its potential impact on the
United States' economy. Traditionally, a buildup of this
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kind had created inflationary pressures on the economy and
reduced productivity [Ref. 32:p. 10]. There was the
additional concern at this point that the nation's defense
industry could not live up to the new product demands.
This time, the defense binge will be accompanied by
domestic spending cuts but also hefty tax cuts, making it
all the more difficult to curb inflation. Many experts
also guestion whether the defense industry, much shrunken
in recent years, can deliver new weaponry on time and
within budge—and, if not, the costs will go higher still.
The buildup also threatens to divert resources from more
productive investment, perhaps delaying the revitalization
of U.S. industry. America's allies, unburdened by high
defense spending, may gain a competitive edge while
America renews its role as the arsenal of democracy.
[Ref. 33:p. 28]
The economic argument against the buildup basically revolved
around the anticipated inflation it was expected to bring.
The fact that the defense industrial base had diminished
during the preceding years of austere defense funding was
expected to lead to shortages and rising costs as smaller
numbers of defense contractors and subcontractors jumped
back into the saddle and competed with the civilian market
for labor, parts and production machinery [Ref. 32: pp. 44-
45] .
After years of dampened military spending, the U.S.
defense industry has dwindled substantially. More than
2,000 aerospace subcontractors left the field between 1968
and 1976, for example, and 240 forging foundries have
closed. There are scattered shortages of men and material
and many firms have cut capacity. [Ref. 39: p. 40]
In addition to the shortages and rising costs, a topic
of serious deliberation was whether or not the defense
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industries could fill the orders at all, more or less on
time:
Industry analysts say the nation's prime defense
contractors do have the capacity to fill the new orders
—
at least in the short run. In the aerospace industry, for
example, the military buildup will simply take up slack
left by declining orders for commercial jets in recent
years. But the squeeze may well be felt at the
subcontractor level. Bottlenecks are inevitable, defense
experts warn, because so many smaller firms have left the
defense business for more dependable commercial contracts.
[Ref. 39:p. 40]
In his thesis [Ref. 32], Couch provided empirical
evidence that there was in fact enough excess industrial
capacity to head off the predicted inflationary pressures
during the Reagan buildup [Ref. 32:pp. 46-47]. He,
additionally, provided empirical evidence to counter the
argument of rising shortages and costs for defense related
labor:
. . . projections that shortages of skilled labor and
technical talent would drive up the cost of labor did not
occur. With the Reagan buildup well underway, a small
degree of slack exists for the areas of employment
considered to be most critical. A properly functioning,
free market system coupled with innovative changes in the
work place to include an increased use of automated
machinery have eased the labor situation. [Ref. 32 :p. 89
Another primary economic concern voiced by many critics
of the Reagan buildup was the blow that such a massive
diversion of resources to a defensive end would have on the
nation's productivity, long-run growth and competitiveness
in the world market. Specifically,
- Such circumstances would place the United States at an
increasing disadvantage vis-a-vis economic competitors
who are not burdened with commensurately heavy military
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costs. "Since we won't be investing in non-defense
industries, we won't be building a base for exports,"
says James Chace, managing editor of Foreign Affairs
magazine, and if America's industrial base becomes too
strained, the nation may have to increase its purchases
from abroad. [Ref. 40: p. 46]
- In the past, argues Thurow [MIT economist] , the United
States could afford a relatively larger military burden
because it had a technological lead over its
competitors. But now, he says, "We're in a world of
technological eguals and can't afford to do the things
we did in 1966." Thurow is also worried that the
buildup will drain resources from such industries as
aerospace and electronics, which still hold a
technological edge over foreign competition. [Ref.
40:p. 46]
- Testifying before Congress in 1983, Degrasse [military
spending critic] stated that approximately thirty
percent of the Nation's scientists and engineers were
working for defense-related projects. DeGrasse further
explained that by having such an important group of
people unavailable to develop civilian technologies,
U.S. products will be less competitive on the world
market. . . . [Ref. 32 :p. 57]
Couch again comes to the rescue and provides empirical
evidence in his thesis that the nation's productivity has
increased during the Reagan rearmament plan. He finds that
an analysis of the productivity data for business and
manufacturing sectors shows a slowing in the 1970s when
defense spending was down and an increase from 1981-1984
during the Reagan's Administration's buildup [Ref. 32: pp.
59-60]. The reasons for this increase are varied, but the
primary reason seems to be attributable to the fact that the
government can afford, with its considerable capital, to
employ scarce material, resources and engineering talent to
ferret out answers to highly complex problems [Ref. 32: pp.
58-59] .
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The logic behind this theory is that by providing an
initial market and premium prices for major advances,
defense purchases have speeded the introduction of new
technologies. . . . Initial purchases such as these by
the defense department have allowed manufacturers to
improve their productivity through better production
methods and reduced cost via the concept of marginal
productivity. [Ref. 32 :p. 59]
With this general presentation of the Reagan
Administration's rearmament plan and the controversy
surrounding it, the next step is to examine whether or not
the plan afforded new opportunities for the gamesmen of
defense politics to practice their skills, and, if so, what
their gamesmanship looked like in the context of particular
defense procurement and expenditure efforts.
C. DEFENSE POLITICS IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
Six case studies typify defense politics during the
Reagan Administration. The six studies, presented in this
section, are:
1. the B-52 strategic bomber replacement




4. the F-18 Hornet
5. the DOD Research Initiative
6. the Strategic Defense Initiative.
In each of these case studies elements of defense
politics in the form of the "military-industrial complex,"
the "congressional-industrial complex," and/or pork barrel
are evident. This is not surprising given the promise of
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such huge defense expenditures during the Reagan
Administration. As the cases show, in some instances, as in
the case of the C-5B transport aircraft, the defense
political influences produce a better weapon system choice.
However, in other cases, such as the F-18 fighter bomber
aircraft, defense political influences force a weapon system
on the services that they do not feel can do the job. And,
finally, the influence of defense politics in making weapons
choices that are neither "good" or "bad," but simply choices
that are "made" involves systems like the B-1B bomber.
1. B-52 Strategic Bomber Replacement
The replacement of the B-52 bomber was an issue of
considerable debate both during the period before the Reagan
Administration and during the Administration. Despite the
controversy, however, the preferences of the president
appeared to be the outcome in most years:
Congress is used to following the Administration's lead
—
any Administration. As Representative Les Aspin
(Wisconsin) pointed out, when President Ford was for the
B-l, Congress was for the B-l. When President Carter was
against the B-l, Congress was against the B-l. And now
that President Reagan supports the bomber so does
Congress. [Ref. 41:p. 13]
In 1980 there was considerable congressional concern
that President Carter's decision to cease production of the
USAF/Rockwell International B-l was detrimental to the U.S.
strategic nuclear weapons deterrent [Ref. 42:p. 12]. The
decision was whether or not to modify the already existing
B-52 to carry cruise missiles in anticipation of new
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technologies that could lead to building the stealth bomber
or build the B-l bomber and jeopardize the possibility of
being able to afford the stealth bomber in the future.
Criticisms of the B-52 were simply that it could not
penetrate Soviet air defenses; by the late 1980s the "look-
down, shoot-down" capability of the Soviet radar planes
would eliminate the B-52s [Ref. 43 :p. 35]. The B-l was
criticized because it was believed that it, too, in the
1990s would eventually become vulnerable to Soviet air
defenses, and its cost was such that its deployment might
preclude the building of the stealth bomber [Ref. 43 :p. 35],
Carter's Under Secretary of Defense, William Perry, said
that money spent on the B-l "would rule out a stealth
follow-on" [Ref. 43:p. 35].
The action on the Fiscal Year 1981 budget saw a
resurgence of interest and spending on the B-l bomber.
During the congressional testimony for the year concerning
the B-l, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, were
soundly reminded where dollars for defense go is sometimes
not in line with their desires.
Rep. Bob Wilson (R. -Calif.) told Brown and Jones that
Fiscal 1981 is the most momentous year since Vietnam and
that the B-l cancellation is a tragedy and "maybe we can
change that this year." Wilson added that Congress will
put money in the budget for the B-l if the Def. Dept. does
not ask for it. . . . Both Brown and the general were
castigated over the earlier decision to stop the B-l
production and for not backing the bomber. Rep. Jim Lloyd
(D. -Calif.) told Brown and Jones they had not worked well
with the House Armed Services Committee in the past,
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adding that he believes Jones is strongly against the B-l
bomber. [Ref. 42:p. 13]
The outcome of the controversy for FY 1981 was
basically to let the new president make the final decision
with some authorization made for development and initial
procurement and some appropriation for development. Exact
dollar figures for the weapon's authorization and
appropriation are printed in Table III-l.
In 1981 President Reagan was extremely supportive of
the B-l deployment. He, as well as a cadre of Air Force
officers, urged its approval in Congress.
They argue that the B-l has been redesigned and could now
play a crucial role in conventional warfare, just as the
B-52 was a workhorse in Vietnam and, more recently, has
flown surveillance missions over the Arabian Sea. As more
B-52s are converted to cruise-missile carriers, they say,
there are fewer available for such conventional roles.
What's more, the new B-l would be a better plane than the
original model. Known as the "B-l derivative," it would
have fixed wings, rather than swing wings, freeing
interior space for more fuel and ammunition, and it would
fly at subsonic rather than supersonic speeds, enabling it
to be built with special alloys that are less easily
detected by Soviet radar. [Ref. 43: p. 35]
The concern in Congress over President Reagan's
decision to support the deployment of the B-l was that
"Reagan might short-change the stealth in order to fund the
B-l" [Ref. 44:p. 35]; a concern also voiced during the
Carter Administration. There was some additional doubt
expressed as to Reagan's ability to deploy the B-l and at


























































Authorization 7/4,654 7/4,654 7/4,654

























Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1980-1985)
64
Reagan favors the new B-l, but he is also on record as
wanting to build more ships and raise military pay and
benefits to retain experienced soldiers. [Ref. 43: p. 35]
The key to Reagan's success in gaining support for
the B-l bomber for FY 1982 lay in the hands of the Chairman
of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Ted
Stevens (Republican-Alaska)
.
The only chance for an anti-B-1 amendment to prevail was
if Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Stevens
followed up his vociferous criticism of the program with
an effort to win votes against the B-l. If Stevens had
voted against the B-l, he would have carried a number of
Committee Republicans with him as well as some moderate
Democrats, and might have even prevailed by a close vote
on the Senate floor.
But the White House and the Pentagon got to Stevens.
His opposition to the B-l was transformed into strong
support. [Ref. 41: p. 14]
In the end, the B-l program was authorized and
appropriated in FY 1982. The dollar amounts are included in
Table III-l, for FY 1982 through 1986. The new B-1B bomber
aircraft is built by Rockwell International's North American
Aircraft Operations located in El Segundo, California.
2 . The A-10 Thunderbolt II and the F-16 Fighting Falcon
In 1982 the House approved $357 million for 20 A-10
Thunderbolt II planes which are used for close air support
for battlefield troops. The Pentagon didn't want the
planes. As a top general from the Tactical Air Command was
quoted:
The A-10 Thunderbolt II is a most unsophisticated plane.
Pilots joke about being struck from behind by
birds. ... We are buying them only because of political
pressure. [Ref. 45:p. 30]
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The last A-10 was to be delivered in 1982 but in the
FY 1982 budget Representative Addabbo (Democrat-New York)
and other New York delegates were able to extend the
production run of the A-10 so that the Farmingdale, New
York, factory, located near Addabbo ' s district, could stay
open. The factory employed about 6000.
The A-10 is often referred to as "Joseph Addabbo' s plane,"
after the Democratic Congressman from Queens, N.Y.; his
district is near the Long Island plant where the fighter
is made by Fairchild Republic Co. Addabbo, chairman of
the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee opposes such big-ticket military items as the B-
1 bomber and the MX missile on the grounds of cost. But
like most of New York's delegation he is a strong advocate
of the A-10. The project is also supported by House
Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill of Massachusetts; the engine for
the plane is made in Lynn, Mass. [Ref. 45 :p. 30]
Congress authorized $229.7 million for 20 A-10
planes in FY 1982. The appropriation for the plane was
$209.7 million to procure 20 A-lOs and $20 million for
components of additional planes to be funded in FY 1983.
[Ref. 44:pp. 226,328]
Unfortunately, with respect to the FY 1983
appropriation, Representative Addabbo was up against some
tough competition in winning funds for "his" plane despite
the House's approval of funds; Senator John Tower was
interested in approval of funds for the F-16 which was built
in Texas.
The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee is
Republican John Tower of Texas; the F-16 Fighting Falcon
is made in Fort Worth by General Dynamics Corp. Tower's
committee cut all funds for the rival A-10. [Ref. 45: p.
30]
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However, Representative Addabbo was confident that the funds
would be restored in conference despite the fact that the
Pentagon accepted the cut without question [Ref. 45:p. 30].
For FY 1983 the authorization for 120 F-16s with
$1,711 billion and an additional $323 million for components
was approved; the total number of planes that could be built
in the following two years was, thus, 150. Appropriations
for the 120 F-16s ($1.71 billion) were agreed upon by the
House and Senate. There were no funds authorized or
appropriated for the A-10. [Ref. 46: pp. 81,281]
3 . The C-5 Debate
It was referred to as one of the fiercest and
shameless lobbying battles that Congress had seen in decades
[Ref. 47:p. 14]. The focus of the battle was the selection
of the best transport plane for the Rapid Deployment Force
(RDF)
:
Six months of jockeying between the Pentagon and Congress
over what to buy as a long-range ferry aircraft for the
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) has erupted into one of the
roughest procurement battles Washington has seen in years.
Defense Dept. officials claim that Congress is playing
politics with what must be a military decision. Congress
is split into warring cams, and the aerospace industry is
in turmoil. [Ref. 48:p. 91]
The ferry plane was essential as the 70 C-5s and 234
C-141s, both types built by Lockheed, were not sufficient to
transport 86,000 RDF troops plus equipment and supplies to
support a war in the Persian Gulf and in Europe [Ref. 48 :p.
91].
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Boeing, Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas were in the
competition to provide a long-range transport plane. All of
the companies needed the work, but Boeing, whose profits
were down 38 percent in 1981, was in the most desperate
need of work as the market for commercial widebody jets had
fallen off. [Ref. 48:p. 91]
The Lockheed plan provided 50 modernized Lockheed C-
5B airlifters and 44 McDonnell Douglas KC-10 tankers; the
cost for the planes would be $11 billion with a delivery
date three years sooner than the Boeing plan. The Boeing
plan was to provide 48 new 747s as substitutes for the
Lockheed 50 C-5Bs or, alternatively, the Department of
Defense was to buy 50 used 747s and contract with Boeing to
modify them. Each new 747 would cost $58 million, and a
used one would cost $44 million with $32 million going to
the airlines. The cost of the C-5B was to be $98 million a
piece.
In January of 1982, the Department of Defense
selected Lockheed to build the new long-range ferry aircraft
that they called the airlifter. Boeing was able to persuade
the Senate to overturn the decision.
One of the things that helped the Boeing decision in
the Senate, besides the dollar savings, was the predicament
of the national airlines. Senator Henry M. Jackson
(Democrat-Washington) was instrumental in bringing this
point to the attention of the Senate; he said by purchasing
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the used 747s that "the airlines would get a much needed
shot in the arm" [Ref. 48:p. 91]. Coincidentally,
On May 13, the day the Senate voted on the defense
authorization bill, Braniff declared bankruptcy. Looking
to trim money from the military budget and to help
distressed airlines, the Senate by voice approved
Jackson's proposal to buy the 747s. [Ref. 47: p. 14]
In the end, the Boeing decision was not only
important to the airlines but it was also most important to
Senator Jackson in that the Boeing company was located in
his home state. Both he and Senator Slade Gorton (Republi-
can-Washington) fought relentlessly for Boeing.
The Senate found the Boeing proposal too sweet to pass up.
In mid-May it voted against its won Armed Services
Committee recommendation to fund the C-5 procurement plan
and told the Pentagon to order widebodied jets instead.
Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), a veteran of 42 years in
Congress, led the fight for Boeing, claiming that high
unemployment in his home state—in part induced by layoffs
at Boeing—would jeopardize his reelection in November.
"Jackson won because he called in every political IOU he'd
ever collected," complains one pro-Lockheed Senate
staffer. [Ref. 48:p. 91]
Senators Sam Nunn (Democrat-Georgia) and Mack
Mattingly (Republican-Georgia) had been proponents in the
Senate for the C-5B that would have been built by Lockheed
in Marietta, Goergia. After their battle was lost in the
Senate, it was up to their counterparts in the House to take
on the cause.
Smooth-tongued Georgians led the House forces for the C-
5B, which was to be built in Marietta, Ga., while a
sguadron of Boeing backers from Washington and Kansas
derided Lockheed's plane as the Edsel of the air. [Ref.
47:p. 14]
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One of the Boeing backers from Washington was Representative
Norman D. Dicks (Democrat-Washington) who was to " . . . move
as Jackson did in the Senate, to strike C-5 funding and
substitute money for the 747s" [Ref. 48:p. 92].
However, a massive lobbying effort was mounted by
the Pentagon and Lockheed. One of the basic objections
voiced by the lobbyists was that the decision in the Senate
was made to basically "bail-out" Boeing rather than focusing
on the appropriate plane for the mission: "Now Lockheed and
Pentagon officials are claiming that the Boeing proposal
amounts to a financial bailout of both Boeing and the
airlines" [Ref. 48:p. 91].
In June of 1982, a 27 page print-out was obtained
from Lockheed which indicated that Air Force and DOD
officials met every morning with Lockheed executives to plan
strategies for obtaining support for the C-5B. One of their
strategies was to lobby 2 50 congressmen by military
personnel or the representatives from the 4 companies who
did subcontractor work on the C-5B. [Ref. 47 :p. 14]
Even the key players at the Pentagon participated in
the lobbying to some extent. The Secretary of the Air
Force, Verne Orr, proclaimed that Boeing had understated the
cost of buying and operating the 747s by almost $5.3 billion
[Ref. 48:p. 92]. Boeing did not sit still for that
accusation:
Boeing's big guns have an answer to that. "The Pentagon
has increased Boeing's firmly committed cost of its 747
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proposal by 40% for reasons not known to Boeing," Chairman
Thornton A. Wilson charged in a stinging letter to the
House Armed Services Committee. [Ref. 48: p. 92]
Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci continued the
effort to garner support for the C-5B by claiming that the
747 was not roomy enough for tanks, helicopters or
howitzers. He said that " . . . it would do absolutely
nothing to solve our main airlift requirement, which is much
more capacity for outsized military equipment" [Ref. 48 :p.
92]. He also complained that the 747 would take too long to
unload and require special equipment to do so; whereas, the
C-5B had flexible landing gear that would allow it to
"kneel" to be unloaded. Again, Boeing had an answer.
Boeing suggested that the currently available C-5s be
devoted to transporting outsized equipment and that the 747s
be used for all other transporting requirements They
countered the difficulty in unloading argument by saying
that 747 landing devices are positioned world-wide to handle
commercial cargo and could easily be transported to military
destinations. As a final argument, Boeing said that the 747
could be flown from the East coast of the United States to
the Persian Gulf without refueling in the air, unlike the C-
5B. [Ref. 48:p. 92]
Despite Boeing's "answers" to hard questions, the
relatively lower cost for the 747s and Representative Dicks'
support for the substitution of the 747, the House Appropri-
ations Committee approved $847.5 million for the C-5B,
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including funds for components and spare parts [Ref. 46 :p.
284] .
The panel also include $60 million, which had been added
to the authorization bill, to buy three wide-body
commercial jets. The panel said these should be assigned
to Air National Guard units. The $60 million was intended
to mollify members who had attempted to kill the revival
of the Lockheed Corp. C-5 production line in favor of
buying Boeing 747s. [Ref. 46:p. 284]
The House finally approved the appropriation for the
C-5B:
Eventually the company, the Air Force and a strong
endorsement by President Reagan persuaded the House that
the 747 did not have the cargo capacity required by the
Rapid Deployment Force: with a ceiling height of just 16
feet, the Boeing plane required that tanks and helicopters
be taken apart and then reassembled at the landing site,
greatly delaying their entry into battle. [Ref. 49 :p. 50]
In August the House and Senate Conference Committee
approved the purchase of 50 C-5B planes. Lockheed of
Marietta, Georgia, would receive $11 billion in revenues and
the addition of 8000 new jobs by the time the last C-5B is
delivered in 1989 [Ref. 49:p. 50]. Figures for authoriza-
tions and appropriations for FY 1984-1986 appear in Table
III-2 below.
4. The F-18 Hornet
The Navy's F-18 Hornet fighter-bomber was originally
a small, relatively low-cost aircraft developed to
complement the $36 million F-14; however, due to "gold-
plating" the plane had gone from $16 million each to $32
million [Ref. 50:p. 16]. In 1978 the Navy told the
Department of Defense in private that it no longer wanted
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TABLE III-2








No. Amt. No. Amt. No. Amt.
FY84 4 1,076 4 1,076 4 1,076
FY85 10 2,099 8 1,782 8 1,682
FY86 16 2,268 16 2,166 16 2,135
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1983-1985)
the plane. "But partly because of strong congressional
support from Massachusetts (the engines are built in Lynn)
,
the program was retained" [Ref. 50:p. 16].
In 1983 the decision still centered around the idea
of scrapping the F-18 to save $2.9 billion [Ref. 50:p. 16],
but again $2,136 billion was appropriated for 84 F-18
fighters [Ref. 46:p. 281]. The plane still was authorized
and appropriated for FY 1986. The figures for the F-18 from
FY 1984-1986 appear in Table III-3 below.
5. The POD Research Initiative
Pork barrel is not confined to weapons systems. In
1985 the Pentagon conceived the University Research
Initiative " . . .to fund research and training in areas of
military interest" [Ref. 51:p. 924]. Almost instantaneously
representatives and senators sought to obtain funding for
their alma maters or schools in their districts.
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TABLE III-3






No. Amt. No. Amt.
FY84 84 2,151 84 2,136
FY85 84 2,686 84 2,626










Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1983-1985)
Oklahoma State University, for example, will probably be
the beneficiary of $1 million from the new program,
courtesy of Representative Wes Watkins (D-Okla.), a 1960
graduate of Oklahoma State and a former assistant director
of admissions there. . . . Syracuse University will
probably be the beneficiary of a $12 million grant for
computer science, which may or may not be drawn from the
new program. Senator Alfonse d'Amato (D-N.Y.) initially
sought $29.5 million for his alma mater from the research
initiative, more than the total amount requested by the
Reagan Administration for all schools. [Ref. 51 :p. 924]
(The $12 million grant had been reduced from $29.5 million
because of protests from the Association of American
Universities and the National Association of State
Universities and Land Grant Colleges.)
Not all requests for research funding by congressmen
were so direct; the FY 1987 defense appropriations bill
included provision for a one million dollar pilot program in




. .a private nonprofit institution which possesses
established expertise in research in advanced
semiconductor materials and devices, and which is
empowered to grant graduate level degrees." The reguest
inserted by Representative Les AuCoin (D.-Ore.), is
intended to benefit the Oregon Graduate Center, just west
of Portland, according to AuCoin 's staff. But the
provision was worded so that other schools may apply and
considerable competition may ensue. [Ref. 51 :p. 924]
6. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
Probably the most controversial weapon system in the
Reagan Administration's rearmament plan will also be the one
most remembered for the implications of pork barrel politics
that surround it. Before the dust settles the SDI will cost
between $90 billion and one trillion dollars.
There has been considerable speculation as to the
real proponents of the SDI. E.P. Thompson, in his article,
"Look Who's Really Behind Star Wars" for Nation [Ref. 52]
wrote:
We cannot simply attribute all to the whims of President
Reagan. Nations do not normally lay heavy burdens on
their taxpayers and inflate the national deficit just to
humor a leader. Nor do national security establishments
endanger their relations with their allies in pursuit of a
strategic hypothesis.
There must be some hidden agenda here and some
powerful interests at work. President Reagan did not
invent the Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.) out of
the air. [Ref. 52:p. 233]
The "powerful interests" at work are primarily key
contactors of the defense industry, communities and research
institutions who all stand to gain current and future
economic benefits from SDI [Ref. 53:p. 20]. But it is the
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defense industries that are considered the most desirous of
SDI simply because they have the most to gain.
We do not have to speculate on who is behind all this,
since they can be identified. Eighty-seven percent of the
S.D.I, and antisatellite contracts in fiscal 1983 and 1984
were received by companies. Seven of those ten are among
the Pentagon's top twenty private arms contractors. They
include the major contractors building offensive weapons:
the MX missile (Rockwell, T.R.W. , AVCO) , The B-l bomber
(Rockwell, AVCO, BOEING, LTV), the Trident missile
(Lockheed) and the cruise missile (Boeing, Litton)
.
Rounding out the group are McDonnell Douglas, Hughes
Aerospace and Teledyne. Martin Marietta (the contractor
for the Pershing 2) came in thirteenth place, after Ford
Aerospace and Science Applications International. No
doubt the table seating will change as other giants move
up, like Grumman and Honeywell, and as new high-tech
consortiums are set up. But this is where the thrust
comes from. [Ref. 52:pp. 234-236]
For FY 1985 the leading SDI contractors were again
among the top Pentagon contractors. Table III-4 gives the
actual dollar amounts.
It is generally believed that the defense industries
were looking to gather a replacement weapon system for the
MX missiles, the B-l bombers, and Pershing missiles, as
their contracts for the systems would run out in the early
1990s [Refs. 52:p. 236; 53:p. 20]. There would be huge
industrial capacities available without weapons to build;
furthermore, dollar revenues would plummet.
According to financial analyst Alan Benasuli of Drexel
Burnham: "SDI will probably take up the slack of regular
military spending, which is scheduled to start levelling
off in 1988." [Ref. 53:p. 22]
William Hartung, in The Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists article, "Star Wars Pork Barrel" [Ref. 53], wrote
that the SDI was "political risk insurance" for the nuclear
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TABLE III-4











Litton (Itek subsidiary) 18.4
McDonnel Douglas 16.7
Source: Strategic Defense Initative Organization,
estimates as of September 23, 1985. Figures
include only funds obligated during fiscal
1985, not the value of long-term awards like
Boeing's five-year, $289 million contract for
the Airborne Optical Adjunct. [Ref. 53 :p. 21]
weapons industry if there were to be a halt to the nuclear
arms race [Ref. 53 :p. 30]. He continued:
If the arms industry had been asked to devise the most
profitable alternative to arms control, they couldn't have
come up with a better proposal than the Star Wars plan.
[Ref. 53:p. 30]
The major nuclear weapons producers were not alone
in their quest for SDI funds:
77
These giants subcontract much work to the minnows of the
trade, and to computer and electronics companies, some of
whom hope to grow into whales. By 1985 there was a
stampede of smaller contractors to the doors of Lieut.
Gen. James Abrahamson's Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization. An investors' newsletter called S.D.I,
"money from heaven," and another commentator likened the
excitement among high-tech operators to a "fish-feeding
frenzy." [Ref. 52:p. 236]
Beyond the powerful defense industry, other forces
were at work to secure dollars in the FY 1984 and FY 1985
authorizations and appropriations for SDI:
- And in 1983 and 1984 ... 77 percent of the prime
contracts for SDI went to states or districts whose
representatives or senators sit on the armed services
committees and the defense appropriations
subcommittees. That is how pork barrel works. [Ref.
52:p. 236]
SDI funds are going to areas that are traditional
military-industry strongholds. Over 95 percent of
prime contracts for SDI work in 1983 and 1984 went to
just five states: California got 45 percent;
Washington, 2 2 percent; Texas, 13 percent; Alabama, 10
percent; and Massachusetts, 5 percent. [Ref. 53: p.
233]
The Reagan Administration played pork barrel
politics from the outset of SDI to ensure support for the
pre ram [Ref. 53 :p. 30]. The economic benefits to be
potentially realized by certain congressional districts can
be easily seen in the attractive dollar amounts in the FY
1985-1986 authorizations and appropriations for SDI
presented in Table III-5.
One of the criticisms of the Reagan Administration's
push for SDI is that the President's Defense Technologies
Study Team, gathered to "... define the technologies
necessary for defending the United States and our allies
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TABLE III-5




FY85 1,777 1,527 1,400
FY8 6 3,713 2,750 2,750
Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1984-1985)
from ballistic missile attack" [Ref. 53:p. 21], had a
composition of members that was one third employees or board
members of military corporations which have since received
substantial research and development awards for SDI [Ref.
53:pp. 21-22].
Another criticism of the SDI push involves the
momentum the weapons system carries with it, primarily
attributable to the trillion dollar price tag attached to
it. Hartung wrote for The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
[Ref. 53]:
As the size of SDI contracts grows and the production runs
of locally manufactured weapons near their close,
legislators from these areas will find it harder and
harder to vote down SDI funds in the face of contractor
(and constituent) pressure. [Ref. 53: p. 23]
In his article for Nation [Ref. 52], Thompson called SDI an
"unstoppable juggernaut" [Ref. 52:p. 219].
Perhaps one of the most potentially damaging
criticisms of the Reagan Administration advocation of SDI is
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the cry of "pork barrel" for California from the critics of
SDI. In 1983 and 1984, 45 percent of the prime contracts in
space weapons went to President Reagan's home state [Ref.
52:p. 236]. By mid-FY 1987 almost one half of the $10.9
billion in contracts secured for SDI had gone to companies
and laboratories in California, according to a report by the
Federation of American Scientists, an organization that has
strongly criticized SDI [Ref. 54:p. 12]. The report was
published in April of 1987, and some of the findings are
presented in Table III-6.
D. SUMMARY
By no means is the preceding presentation of weapon
systems all inclusive of those that have been mired in
defense political struggles: some systems, in the end,
being deployed and others not. However, the point is simply
that the large dollar amounts the Reagan Administration
proposed to spend on its rearmament plan provides fertile
ground for all sorts of defense political games.
In the following chapter, the trends in defense prime
contract awards will be examined, with a special emphasis on
the awards made in California, to determine the impact of
defense politics during the Reagan Administration.
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TABLE III-6
LEADING STATES, CITIES, CORPORATIONS BY SDI CONTRACT AWARDS
LEADING STATES BY SDI CONTRACT AWARDS
California $4.9 billion 45.1% of the total awards
New Mexico 1.3 12.4
Massachusetts 1.0 9.0
Alabama .6 6.1
LEADING CITIES BY SDI CONTRACT AWARDS
Los Angeles, CA $2.6 billion 504 contracts












$8 billion total or 73% of the SDI contracts
OTHER CONTRACTORS BY SDI CONTRACTS
Federal Laboratories $1.5 billion or 14% of total
Universities .700 6
Government Agencies .450 4
Non-profit organizations $100 thousand or 1% of total
Foreign firms 100 1




After examining the phenomenon of defense politics,
particularly exemplified by the "military-industrial
complex," the "congressional-industrial complex," and plain,
old pork barrel, in theory and in fact, it now comes time to
look at California in particular. To recall, there is a
generally held notion that California has been the primary
beneficiary of the increased defense spending that has
resulted from the Reagan Administration's military buildup.
In this chapter, this notion will be challenged on the basis
of an analysis of the trends in the award of DOD prime
contracts in the United States from FY 1980 through FY 1986.
Basically, California has not received an inordinate share
of DOD prime contracts since the buildup began; California
was the leader in contract awards well before the Reagan
Administration initiated its plans, and it has continued as
the leader. The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to
proffering some alternative explanations, with defense
political overtones, that may help to give reason for
California's first slot in contract awards.
B. THE BOTTOM LINE
The net value of DOD prime contracts awarded to
California made a large percentage jump in FY 1982: a
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percentage change of approximately 3 5.9 percent from
$16,698,825,000 in FY 1981 to $22,684,515,000 in FY 1982.
The net value of prime contracts awarded to California rose
by 16.3 percent, 8.1 percent and 2.1 percent in FY 1983,
1984 and 1985, respectively. Not until FY 1986 did the
dollar value of the prime contracts awarded to California
fall; the net value dropped by 4 . 7 percent at that time.
It is interesting that the net value of the prime
contracts awarded to California would jump so dramatically
in FY 1982. Basically, FY 1982 was the first defense budget
that was more or less representative of the ideals of the
new Administration. The FY 1981 defense budget was already
enacted by January of 1981 when President Reagan was
inaugurated, and the changes that could be effected were in
the form of supplementals. To keep this 35.9 percent figure
in perspective, three things should be noted. First, no
matter how dramatic the jump may seem, it was not high
enough to qualify California as one of the top four states
for FY 1982 with the largest percentage increase in awards.

















Secondly, it should be pointed out that none of the five
states with the top dollar awards were ever included as
states with the largest percentage change in awards in
reports compiled by the Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports (DIOR) [Refs. 55-60] . Finally, it
should be noted that the FY 1982 percentage change in
contract awards was the only time in this period, FY 1980
through FY 1986, that California was the state with the
greatest percentage change of the five states awarded the
top dollars in DOD prime contracts.
Whereas California did not receive the largest
percentage change in awards, the state did receive the
largest dollar value change of any state for FY 1981 through
FY 1984:
FY81: $2,784,296,000 increase in contract awards
FY82: 5,985,690,000 increase in contract awards
FY83: 3,702,645,000 increase in contract awards
FY84: 2,132,581,000 increase in contract awards
These dollar figures, taken out of the context of the
relative total state DOD prime contract awards, could lead
to the conclusion that in FY 1981 through FY 1984 California
did benefit more from the Reagan buildup than any other
state. However, it is essential to consider the changes in
the context of the immensity of the awards given to
California for an adequate comparison; then the changes fall
more in line with those for other states.
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Table IV-1 presents the net value and percent distribu-
tion of DOD prime contracts for the leading five states from
FY 1980 through FY 1986. Three cautions should be
delineated before any conclusions are drawn from the data
presented in Table IV-1; they are:
1. In FY 1984 the DIOR changed the presentation of the
report of DOD prime contracts awarded by state over
$10,000 to DOD prime contracts awarded by state over
$25,000. Interestingly enough, no changes in dollar
figures occurred.
2. "Prime contract data are not a means of measuring the
total volume of defense work performed within a state,
as a substantial amount of work may be subcontracted."
[Ref. 60:p. 1]
3. "Contract work is not necessarily performed in the
state where the contract is awarded. Most manufactur-
ing contracts have been attributed to the contractor's
location where the product will be processed and
assembled. When contract work has been performed at
more than one plant, the contract has been attributed
to the location where the largest dollar amount of
work was produced. Both construction and service
contracts have been attributed to the state where the
work is to be performed. Contracts for transportation
and communication services in most cases have been
attributed to the state where the contractor's home
office is located. For purchases from wholesale or
other distribution firms, the location is the
contractor's business address." [Ref. 60 :p. 1]
By far and away, California has consistently been
awarded a higher percentage of DOD prime contracts from FY
1980 to FY 1986. Vying for second place have been Texas and
New York; but their percentage of the U.S. total has always
been less than nine percent each as compared to California's
19 percent or more. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Missouri,
Virginia and Florida have generally switched off holding



































































,914,429 20.4 19.2 3 20.6 20.2
,678,789 8.3 15.6 4 8.7
,413,352 8.0 27.8 1 7.5
,879,061 5.7 2.7 5 6.7
,743,171 5.5 25.5 2 5.3
,698,825 19.0 20.0 3 20.4 28.9
,503,964 8.6 38.6 1 8.0
,520,511 7.4 14.8 5 7.4
,604,946 5.2 23.0 2 5.5
,494,258 5.1 15.9 4 5.7
,684,515 21.8 35.9 1 19.0 18.3
,776,097 7.5 19.3 4 7.4
,872,304 6.6 -8.4 5 8.6
,905,036 5.7 31.4 2 5.1
,354,049 5.2 21.4 3 5.0
,387,160 22.2 16.3 5 21.8 14.3
,634,611 8.1 23.9 2 7.5
,228,879 6.9 19.7 3 6.6
,071,810 6.0 73.2 1 3.9






CA 28,519,741 23.0 8.1 3 22.2
NY 9,514,628 7.7 -1.3 5 8.1
TEXAS 8,750,329 7.1 6.3 4 6.9
MASS 7,028,885 5.7 11.1 2 5.3
MO 6,520,208 5.3 15.7 1 4.7
CA 29,114,566 20.8 2.1 5 23.0
TEXAS 10,561,556 7.5 20.7 1 7.1
NY 10,032,702 7.2 5.5 4 7.7
MASS 7,713,546 5.5 9.7 3 5.7
MO 7,612,713 5.4 16.8 2 5.3
CA 27,737,750 20.4 -4.7 3 20.8
TEXAS 10,940,227 8.0 3.6 4 7.5
NY 9,908,384 7.3 -1.2 5 7.2
MASS 8,734,860 6.4 13.2 1 5.5
FL 5,664,138 4.2 7.5 2 3.8





Fiscal Years 1978, 1979, 1980
Fiscal Years 1979, 1980, 1981
Fiscal Years 1980, 1981, 1982
Fiscal Years 1982, 1983, 1984
Fiscal Years 1983, 1984, 1985
Fiscal Years 1984, 1985, 1986
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C. CALIFORNIA AND THE PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF DOD PRIME
CONTRACT AWARDS BY MAJOR PROCUREMENT PROGRAM
Given that California has been awarded the highest net
value and percentage of total DOD prime contracts from FY
1980 through FY 1986, it follows that the state would con-
sistently be one of the top five states receiving the high-
est dollar value DOD prime contracts by major procurement
program; Tables IV-2 through IV-7 indicate that this is, in
fact, the case. (Information on FY 1983 is unavailable.)
Be )re careful scrutiny of the tables, it is important to
consider the additional informa-tion that DIOR provides for
them:
Some special characteristics of the data on prime contract
awards by procurement program category should be noted:
1. The Electronics and Communication Equipment category
includes all electronics procured separately under prime
contract. However, in the case of Missiles and Space
Systems or Aircraft Engines and Related Spares,
electronics work is often a basic part of the assembly
prime contract; therefore, awards for electronics are
included in the statistics for these categories.
2. Contracts for all other types of equipment and parts
for repair, maintenance, overhaul, modification, or other
services, which can be identified with a specific cate-
gory, are assigned to that category. As an example, the
installation or inspection of equipment at ballistic
missile sites is recorded as missile work in the state
where the site is located. However, the contract for
manufacturing such equipment is reported according to the
location of the manufacturer's plant. Therefore,
aircraft, missile, or other program contracts may be
reported in states where there are no weapon assembly
plants but where bases, laboratories, or suppliers of
instruments, parts, or support equipment may be located.
3. The dollar value shown for each category includes the
RDT&E work associated with it. RDT&E coverage includes
research, exploratory development, advanced development,
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and management and support. Full definitions for each of
these categories are provided in Federal Acquisition
Regulation 35.001.
4 . Figures in these tables may not add up due to
rounding. [Ref. 60 :p. 1]
The findings of Tables IV-2 through IV-7 are summarized
in Table IV-8 and as follows:
- In FY 1980, California was number one in eight of 25
procurement categories and in the top five of 18 of the
25 categories. Table IV-2.
- In FY 1981, California was number one in 10 of 25
procurement categories and in the top five of 2 of the
25 categories. Table IV-3 .
- In FY 1982, California was number one in 10 of 25
procurement categories and in the top five of 2 of the
25 categories. Table IV-4
.
- In FY 1984, California was number one in 11 of 25
procurement categories and in the top five of 17 of the
25 categories. Table IV-5.
- In FY 1985, California was number one in eight of 25
procurement categories and in the top five of 17 of the
25 categories. Table IV-6.
- In FY 1986, California was number one in 11 of 25
procurement categories and in the top five of 17 of the
25 categories. Table IV-7.
Obviously, because California has enjoyed such large
shares of the total major procurement program prime contract
awards—with the exception of the Aircraft Engines and
Related Spares, Non-Combat Vehicles, and Textiles, Clothing
and Equipage programs, where it has never been among the top
five states— it is difficult to discern any trends other
than consistently high net value awards in almost every
procurement category. It is interesting to note, however,
that California would appear to have had the "lion's share"
95
TABLE IV-8















weapons X X X X
ammunition X X X
electronics and X X X X
communications equip.
petroleum X
subsistence X X X X
production equipment X X
construction X X X X
photographic equipment
and supplies





Sources: DOD DIOR Prime Contract Awards by Region and
State: Fiscal Years 1978, 1979, 1980; Fiscal
Years 1979, 1980, 1981; Fiscal Years 1980,
1981, 1982; Fiscal Years 1982, 1983, 1984;
Fiscal Years 1983, 1984, 1985; Fiscal Years
1984, 1985, 1986
96
of the Missile and Space Systems prime contracts throughout
this time frame. In FY 1980, California was awarded 44.2
percent of the total U.S. value of these contract awards, as
compared to the state's closest rival, Massachusetts, which
had 12.9 percent. This percentage fell off somewhat after
FY 1980, but in FY 1986, California was still awarded 34.3
percent of the total net value of prime Missile and Space
Systems contracts; the state's closest rival, again, being
Massachusetts with 17.5 percent of the awards.
The specific net dollar values of these DOD prime
contract awards by major procurement program distributed in
California is shown in Tables IV-9 and IV-10.
D. CALIFORNIA AND THE TOP DOD PRIME CONTRACTORS
One guestion that immediately comes to mind, while
examining the information on DOD prime contract awards, is
simply whether the larger net value and percentage of total
contracts is awarded to California because it may happen to
be the location of the major DOD prime contractors. Table
IV-11 presents the top five contractors receiving the
largest dollar volume of prime contract awards in the United
States from FY 1982 through FY 1986. Table IV-12 presents
the top five contractors receiving the largest dollar volume
of prime contract awards in California for the same period.
Not all corporate or home offices of the contractors
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tion; radar and mis-
siles; R&D; tanks
(21.3% of total awards
over $10,000)
A/C prod. ; nuclear sub-
marines; missile sys.;
tanks
A/C and missile system
production
A/C and missile comp.





A/C and missile comp.
and prod. ; R&D




















Gas turbines and jet
engines aircraft
















































(21.4% of total awards
over $25,000)



















































A/C comp. ; missile
prod. ; electronic
equip. ; R&D
A/C and missile comp.
;




sys. eng. ; R&D
Missile comp., prod.,
and repair; R&D
Prod, of combat veh.
;
R&D
(37.9% of total awards
over $10,000)
Aircraft & missile
comp. ; R&D, elec. &
navigation equip.
Aircraft comp. ; mis-











Prod, and comp. air-
craft; maint & repair;
R&D







2 . Hughes Aircraft
Co. 2,222,768
3. Lockheed Missiles
































































(42.9% of total awards
over $25,000)








state was done by a plant, division or subsidiary of the
parent company.
In FY 1982 two of the top contractors in the United
States were also two of the top five prime contractors in
California, General Dynamics Corp. and Hughes Aircraft Co.
In FY 1983 and FY 1984, the United States shared three of
the top prime contractors in common with California:
Rockwell International Corp., General Dynamics Corp. and
McDonnell Douglas Corp. Rockwell International Corp. and
General Dynamics Corp. were common contractors to the United
States and California in FY 1985; but McDonnell Douglas
Corp. was the top contractor for the United States, whereas
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter was among the top contractors
in California for the FY. Finally, in FY 1986, California
and the United States again share three of the top five
contractors in common: General Dynamics Corp. , McDonnell
Douglas Corp. and Rockwell International Corp. While not
all the dollar amounts awarded to the top shared contractors
ended up in California, a good percentage did. Table IV-13
illustrates this point.
E. CALIFORNIA AND MILITARY ACTIVE DUTY AND CIVILIAN
COMPENSATION
Thus far it has been established that California was
awarded the greatest net value of prime contract awards of
all the states from FY 1980 through FY 1986. In addition,
and most logically, California was one of the top five
106
TABLE IV- 13

































national Corp. 5 . 570 , 526
Total 19,862,214
Sources: Atlas/State Data Abstract for the United


























states awarded prime contracts for almost every major
procurement program category for the same time frame. And,
finally, there were at least two or three of the top five
contractors in the United States who were also the top
contractors in California for the FY 1980-1986 period.
Given that California has led the pack in the preceding
sections, it would seem reasonable to assume that California
would also have the largest concentration of military active
duty and DOD-employed civilians. Table IV-14 presents the
leading five states for FY 1980 through FY 1986 in personnel
compensation for military active duty and total compensa-
tion; total compensation includes military active duty,
civilian, reserve and National Guard and retired military
pay. In addition to personnel compensation, the number and
percentage of total military active duty and DOD-employed
civilian personnel are given.
As Table IV-14 clearly presents, California is, again,
the unquestioned first place holder; the state has more
active duty military personnel and DOD-employed civilians
than any other state. The dollars spent in total compensa-
tion for the aforementioned personnel, the reserves, the
National Guard and retired military are, again, more than
for any other state. The question is whether or not there
is a link between these personnel figures and the award of
prime contracts in California. It is tempting to wonder,


















































































































































































































































































































1986 CA 5,597,902/17.9 12,486,309/15.3 208,960/15.2
3,877,041/13.8 135,162/14.1
479,967/12.2
VA 3,778,162/12.1 8,396,265/10.3 98,324/7.1
3,215,244/11.4 106,088/11.1
248,478/6.3
TX 2,463,382/7.9 6,187,948/7.6 135,278/9.8
63,594/6.6
286,379/7.3









Sources: DOD Selected Manpower Statistics FY 1980
and FY 1981
Atlas State Data Abstract for the U.S.
FY 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986
Defense Magazine Sept 1981, Sept 1982,









personnel to support them, or the personnel and then the
contracts because the labor base could support the work.
Or, alternatively, these large numbers of DOD connected
personnel may exert such a strong constituency pressure on
the congressmen in the surrounding districts that votes in
Congress look a lot like votes for pork barrel. Whereas
Neil Heighberger [Ref. 16] did not find conclusive evidence
to support his proposition that representatives who
represent districts with a high military presence were
strong supporters of ethno-security programs, it might be
interesting to update the study and concentrate on
California given the very large numbers of DOD personnel in
the state.
F. CALIFORNIA AND CONGRESSMEN
Generally, as Representative Les Aspin (Democrat-
Wisconsin) espoused [Ref. 22], congressmen from areas with a
large number of defense constituents, specifically, defense
contractors, try to get on committees in Congress where they
can best serve their constituents. The congressmen in
California are no exception. Senator Pete Wilson
(Republican) has been on the Senate Armed Services Committee
since 1983. The House has California representatives
serving on the Armed Services Committee and the Appropria-
tions Committee. Table IV-15 shows the representatives from
California serving on these two committees as of 1986.
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TABLE IV- 15
CALIFORNIA REPRESENTATIVES ON THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
AND HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES
Years Counties No. of
Dist. Rep. Committee on Served Constitu-
Committee ents
4th V. Fazio (D) Approp. 1980-1986 Sac, 525,764
Solano,
Yolo
8th R.V. Dellums Armed 1980-1986 Alameda, 525,646
(D) Services Contra
Costa
25th E.R. Roybal Approp. 1980-1986 Los 526,013
(D) Angeles
28th J.C. Dixon Approp. 1980-1986 Los 525,993
(D) Angeles




40th R.E. Badham Armed 1980-1986 Orange 525,935
(R) Services
41th B. Lowery Approp. 1985-1986 San 526,043
(R) Diego
45th D.L. Hunter Armed 1981-1986 San 525,927
(R) Services Diego,
Imperial
Source: 1986 Congressional Staff Directory,
28th Edition
Of the eight representatives on these committees, it is
interesting that four of them serve the two cities where in
FY 1986 the greatest dollar value of prime contracts in
California were awarded: Los Angeles with prime contract
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awards of $5,474,975,000 and San Diego with $1,697,612,000.
Representatives Roybal and Dixon share the city of Los
Angeles in their congressional districts, and Representa-
tives Lowery and Hunter serve the city of San Diego. Of the
other representatives featured in Table IV-15, three
representatives have within their districts military bases
that rank among the top ten in numbers of personnel
stationed in California at individual bases:
Representative Fazio—McCellan AFB (4th)
Representative Lewis—Twentynine Palms MCAGCC (10th)
Representative Badham—El Toro MCAS (8th)
G. SUMMARY
It can be said that California is, by far, awarded more
DOD prime contracts than any other state; this was the case
before the Reagan Administration began its military buildup
and after the plan was initiated. The trend analysis simply
does not support the notion that California has benefited
more than any other state from the buildup.
The fact that California has been number one in prime
contract awards for such a long period of time may be
related to the fact that many of the defense contractors
awarded contracts choose to do their work in California and
that many of the major procurement items are manufactured in
the state. The potential influence of a defense-oriented
constituency as large as the one in California—composed of
the large number of defense contractors, military active
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duty personnel, DOD-employed civilians, reserve, National
Guard and retired military personnel— is, perhaps,
unsurpassed by any other state. And the presence of the
large number of congressmen on the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees and Appropriations Committees attest to
the importance of that constituency.
Given California's enviable position, the next chapter
will examine the Commission on State Finance's views of
defense expenditures in the state as promulgated in their
1986 report, Impact of Federal Expenditures on California
[Ref. 3].
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V. THE STATE'S PERSPECTIVE
A. BACKGROUND
The Commission on State Finance for California produced
a report in August of 1986 called The Impact of Federal
Expenditures on California . The Commission was required by
AB 623 (Chapter 1027/85) to: (a) develop and maintain an
economic model capable of estimating the impact of certain
federal expenditures on California's economy, (b) project
federal expenditures coming into California, and (c)
estimate the impact of these expenditures on the state's
economy and on General Fund revenues [Ref. 3: p. 1] . The
specifications of the report, detailed in Section 13895.3 of
the Government Code, enacted by AB 62 3, are as follows:
The commission's report shall address both of the
following:
(a) Projections of federal expenditures coming into the
state and changes in these expenditures.
(b) The impact of these expenditures on the state's
economic growth, employment, tax revenues, and other
variables determined to be significant by the commission,
for the next year compared to the previous three years.
The report shall also identify significant federal
expenditures or potential expenditures coming into the
state affecting military bases, installations, and active
duty and retired military personnel located within the
state as well as the impact of changes in these
expenditures. [Ref. 3: p. 5]
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Federal expenditures as defined by AB 62 3 include defense
spending for military personnel, procurement, operations and
maintenance, and research and development.
This report, August 1986, was the first one of its kind,
and it is to become a semi-annual publication in the future.
May and November will be the target months for new, updated
report availability.
B. DEFENSE SPENDING AND CALIFORNIA'S SHARE
1 . Total Spending and Califc nia's Share
The Commission on State Finance acknowledges, up
front, that its keen interest in producing the report is
driven by the fact that California receives an above average
share of military and contract spending and that much of
this defense spending is discretionary in nature under more
immediate control by the President and Congress [Ref. 3:pp.
5-6] . This above average share of military spending is
evident in the estimated figures for FY 198 6 and the
forecasted figures for FY 1987 presented by the state. Of
the $258.4 billion that the United States categorized as
defense spending in FY 1986, California saw $48.5 billion of
the amount, or 18.8 percent of the total for the United
States [Ref. 3:p. 6]. In FY 1987, the defense spending in
California is expected to be about $50.7 billion, or 18.7
percent of the United States' outlays in defense. Table V-
1, which is reproduced from the report, clearly presents
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TABLE V-l
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES: HISTORY AND FORECAST
(Billions of Dollars)
UNITED STATES Actual Estimate Forecast
1984 1985 1986 1987
Federal Spending-Dept. of Defenseab
Military Personnel $47.1 $50.0 $52.4 $56.4
Retired Pay 16.5 17.6 18.8 19.6
Operations 66.8 73.6 : 76.1 82.9
Procurement: 61.4 70.3 75.5 74.9
Aircraft 23.0 26.5 29.4 28.9
Missiles 9.4 10.7 12.7 12.4
Other 29.0 33.0 33.4 33.6
RDT&E 22.9 27.0 28.6 30.3
Military Construction 6.0 6.9 7.0 6.9
Total, Defense Spending $220.8 $245.4 $258.4 $271.0
Federal Spending - Nondefense
Contracts $43.1 $48.4 $46.9 $43.6
Pay 36.7 38.7 39.8 41.0
Total Nondefense Spending $79.8 $87.1 $86.7 $84.6
Total, Federal Spending $300.6 $332.5 $345.1 $355.6
CALIFORNIA Actual Estimate Forecast
1984 1985 1986 1987
Federal Spending-Dept. of Defense &,b
Military Personnel $6.2 $6.5 $6.8 $7.3
Retired Pay 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.8
Operations 10.0 11.0 11.4 12.4
Procurement 13.8 16.2 17.6 17.5
Aircraft 5.3 6.1 6.8 6.7
Missiles 2.7 3.1 3.7 3.6
Other 5.7 7.0 7.1 7.2
RDT&E 7.1 8.5 8.9 9.7
Military Construction 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1
Total, Defense Spending $40.4 $45.7 $48.5 $50.7
Federal Spending - Nondefense
Contracts $5.9 $6.1 $5.9 $5.6
Pay 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1
Total Nondefense Spending $8.5 $8.9 $8.9 $8.7
Total, Federal Spending $48.9 $54.6 $57.4 $59.4
Commission on State Finance
August 1986
Source: [Ref. 3:p. 10]
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these figures along with actual expenditures for the United
States and California in 1984 and 1985.
Two defense spending categories in Table V-l merit
comment. The procurement outlays in the table include:
- acquisition of new weapons, such as the B-1B bomber, MX
missile and Trident missile system
- the major modification of existing systems
- the purchase of spare and repair parts.
The table also shows a decline in total procurement outlays
from FY 1986 to FY 1987 which is attributable to lower
aircraft and missile procurement for the current year. It
is also important to note that current and proposed SDI
spending is included in the RDT&E category in Table V-l for
both the United States and California. [Ref. 3:p. 11]
From a more long-range perspective, California has
experienced a growth in defense spending in the state which
is somewhat greater than the national average:
The rapid buildup in defense spending from 1979 to 1985 is
giving way to much slower growth in 1986 and 1987. After
growing at an average annual rate of 6.9% during the past
four years, real (inflation-adjusted) national defense
outlays are expected to increase by only 1.9% in 1986 and
1.2% in 1987, according to the targets set by the
congressional spending resolution passed in late June. We
expect outlays in California, which grew at an average
annual rate of 9.9% (in real terms) between 1983 and 1985,
to increase by 4.2% in 1986 and 0.9% in 1987. [Ref. 3:p.
2]
2 . Prime Contract Spending and California's Share
The Commission on State Finance concludes that the
reason for California's large share of defense spending can
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be primarily attributed to the disproportionate amount of
prime contract spending in the state [Ref. 3: p. 16].
The trends in prime contract awards in California
noted by the Commission, although derived from the defense
prime contract information maintained by Data Resources,
Inc. , a consulting firm which tracks defense spending, are
not much different than those previously presented in
Chapter IV. The Commission concluded that since the 1960's
California has received 15 to 20 percent of all DOD prime
contracts awarded in the United States. The largest
categories of defense contract spending reported by the
Commission were Aircraft, Missiles and Electronics and
Communications, with the highest share of procurement
spending in the Weapons, Missiles and Space Equipment and
Aircraft categories. The large B-1B contract, awarded to
Rockwell International, was attributed with helping to
increase California's share of DOD prime contracts from 16.4
percent in 1979 to 19.5 percent in 1984. [Ref. 3:p. 20]
In Chapter IV, the basic conclusion concerning
trends in the award of DOD prime contracts was simply that
California was by far and away the leading state. The
Commission draws a similar conclusion, however, they
attribute the simplicity of the conclusion to the volatility
of defense spending in certain categories:
It is difficult to develop any firm conclusions from
these data on underlying trends regarding California's
market share of total prime contracting. This is partly
because some of the categories have been quite volatile
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from year to year. For example, . . . aircraft procure-
ment in California fell over 50% between 1976 and 1979.
What is clear is that California has maintained a large
share of defense spending over the past 25 years. [Ref.
3:p. 21]
In an interesting slant on the prime contract
spending information, the Commission on State Finance
concludes that while California may have been the largest
recipient of DOD prime contract awards, in FY 1985 the state
was ranked fourth among 50 states on a per capita basis.
The $3 billion in prime contract awards worked out to be
$1,161 in per capita prime contract spending in California,
behind Connecticut ($1,745), Missouri ($1,503), and
Massachusetts ($1,323). However, this per capita figure for
California was above the $644 per capita average for all
states. [Ref. 3:p. 21] Figure 2, below, presents this
information more graphically.
C. DEFENSE SPENDING AND CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMY
1. Defense Spending in 1986
The Commission's report does not minimize the impact
of federal defense spending in California; however, the
document does point out that although federal defense
purchases are large in absolute terms they account for only
a part of the economic activity in California. "In 1986,
production arising from defense spending (in terms of both
prime and subcontracting) will account for about 9.3% of
total private output in California. ..." [Ref. 3:p. 2]
The Commission does go on to make it clear that defense
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Source: [Ref. 3: p. 21]
Figure 2 . Per Capita Defense Prime Contract Spending
spending is vital to some manufacturing industries in the
state.
The effects of defense spending on California's key
manufacturing industries are considerably more important.
For example, defense spending accounts for about 16.3% of
total manufacturing output, and a much higher 55.8% of
output in the aerospace industry, 38.9% in the communica-
tions and electrical equipment industry, and 22.0% of
electronic components and semiconductor production in this
state. [Ref 3:p. 2]
Table V-2 is reproduced from the Commission's report
and compares total California output to defense-related
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TABLE V-2
CALIFORNIA OUTPUT RELATED TO DEFENSE SPENDING IN 1986
(Output in billions of 1972 dollars)
Defense
1986 Total Share of
Calif. Calif. Total

























244.5 $4.5 $2.1 $0.4 $2.5 55.8%
Total - Private Economy
Federal Government
15
253.0 12.7 4.2 0.8 5.0 38.9
158.0 12.2 0.1 2.6 2.7 22.0
501.4 23.8 3.9 1.0 4.9 20.6
2,077.8 121.9 12.6 7.3 19.9 16.3
59.2 7.5 0.7 0.1 0.8 11.3
105.5 19.2 1.1 0.8 1.9 9.7
592.1 28.0 0.6 1.8 2.5 8.8
110.9 5.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 8.1
699.9 24.6 0.7 1.2 2.0 8.1
46.0 1.8 0.0 0.1 0.1 6.9
2,109.6 39.6 0.8 1.5 2.3 5.9
2,780.6 33.9 0.2 1.4 1.6 4.6
645.3 36.6 0.4 1.3 1.7 4.6
759.0 59.9 0.0 2.1 2.1 3.5
333.3 6.6 0.0 0.2 0.2 3.1
525.8 21.8 0.4 0.2 0.6 2.8
9,924.1 $338.1 $15.4 $15.9 $31.3 9.3%
351.1 $11.0 $4.9 $0.0 $4.9 44.6%
Note: Output estimates developed from data supplied by Data Resources, Inc.
Commission on State Finance
August 1986
Source: [Ref. 3:p. 28]
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California output in dollar amounts, and it establishes a
defense share percentage of the total output.
As previously stated, the defense spending in
California will account for 9.3 percent of total private
output in the state in 1986. The industries that appear to
have a large percentage of their output dependent upon
defense spending include the aerospace, communications and
electrical equipment and electronic components industries.
About 16.3 percent of the total manufacturing output in
California is defense-related. According to the Commission,
one half of total defense-related output results from prime
contracts. The other half results from subcontracts and
secondary purchases, such as raw materials. [Ref. 3: p. 27]
2 . Hypothetical Effect on California's Economy of
Varying Growth Rates in Federal Defense Spending
The Commission on State Finance devised an
econometric model of California, augmented by the DRI input-
output based defense modeling system, to estimate the impact
of defense contract spending on employment, income and
revenues in California. The econometric model was used with
varying scenarios, which incorporated different assumptions
about the growth of federal defense spending, to predict the
impact of defense spending on growth in these economic
variables—employment, income and revenue— in California.
The results of the model simulation are depicted in Table V-
3. The defense spending growth rates were inflation-
adjusted and range from minus 9 percent to plus 9 percent in
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TABLE V-3
HYPOTHETICAL EFFECT ON CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMY
OF VARYING GROWTH RATES IN FEDERAL SPENDING












Difference in Growth in Real Defense
Spending Entering California Relative to Baseline
-9% -6% -3% +3% +6%
Effects on Economy
+9%
1.4 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
2.4 -1.6 -0.8 0.0 0.8 1.7 2.4
2.1 -1.4 -0.7 0.0 0.7 1.4 2.1
3.5 -2.4 -1.2 0.0 1.2 2.5 3.7
5.0 -3.4 -1.7 0.0 1.8 3.6 5.3
1.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2
1.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2
1.4 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.4
Source: [Ref. 3:p. 31]
reflect actual growth rates in United States defense
spending during the last fifteen years. [Ref. 3:p. 30]
According to the Commission, the table illustrates
some important points:
(1) Increases or decreases in federal spending have
relatively modest effects on "aggregate" growth rates
in California. For example, a decrease of 9 percent
in defense spending lowers overall employment growth
by only 1.4 percent.
(2) These modest changes in aggregate growth rate hide
the more pronounced impacts that would occur in key
California manufacturing sectors. For example, the
same 9 percent decrease in real defense spending
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would elicit a 5.0 percent decrease in employment
growth in the aerospace industry.
(3) Revenue growth, represented by the General Funds
category, is a little more sensitive to changes in
federal spending than income growth. Using the 9
percent decrease in real defense spending example
again, the growth in the General Funds category would
be depressed by 1.4 percent, while the growth in the
personal income would only suffer a 1.2 percent drop.
The Commission attributes this fact to the more
elastic nature of income tax and the concentration in
the manufacturing sector of an increase in defense
spending. [Ref. 3:pp. 30-32]
The Commission examined several of the considera-
tions in using an econometric model to estimate impacts on
the economy. First, the analysis is focused on statewide
average effects in federal spending, and certain programs,
firms, and/or industries may be impacted greatly or not at
all by changes in defense spending [Ref. 3:p. 34].
Certain programs may be dramatically affected by defense
or nondefense cutbacks, while others may not be affected
at all. For example, decisions on funding for the
Strategic Defense Initiative may be very important to
firms that specialize in research and development and in
advanced weapons systems.
Finally, even during periods of overall stable or
rising funding, individual firms and industries may
experience cutbacks as large production contracts are
phased out. For example, Rockwell is scheduled to deliver
forty-three B-1B bombers to the Air Force in 1987, but
only twenty-three in 1988, and zero in 1989. The phaseout
of this contract will inevitably lead to layoffs at
Rockwell, regardless of overall congressional funding
levels for defense during the next two years. [Ref. 3: pp.
34-35]
The second consideration the Commission notes is
that the impact estimates are based on alternative growth
rates in defense spending which are independent of all other
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factors. This, according to the Commission, is an
artificiality of the simulation which makes it unrealistic:
However, changes in federal spending would clearly have
important feedbacks on the economy, which in many cases
might mitigate the impacts shown above. For example, in
the case of a reduction of defense spending, the resulting
savings in federal expenditures would be available for (a)
increased funding of other programs, (b) tax reduction (or
at least a reduction in a scheduled tax increase) , or (c)
reduction in the deficit. [Ref. 3:p. 35]
D. REGIONAL ASPECTS OF DEFENSE SPENDING AND CALIFORNIA
Unlike Chapter IV, which presented some .nformation on
the major locations of defense expenditure by city and
concentrations of military personnel by base in relation to
the appropriate congressional districts, the Commission on
State Finance compiled the distribution of defense-related
prime contracts among the 54 California counties receiving
DOD prime contracts in FY 1985. Table V-4 is the table
included in the report and shows the 54 counties ranked on
the basis of per capita defense prime contract spending.
Santa Clara had the highest per capita spending with over
$3,272 per person; Santa Barbara followed with over $2,412,
and Los Angeles County was ranked third with $1,929.06 per
capita in defense contract dollars. However, Los Angeles
County was the leader in total DOD prime contract awards
with over $15.5 billion in awards. In the individual prime
contract categories, Los Angeles led the other counties in
the Production and Service categories, with the award of
68.4 percent and 22.6 percent, respectively, of the total
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TABLE V-4
COUNTY DISTRIBUTION OF 1985 DEFENSE PRIME CONTRACT AWARDS
OVER $25,000 RANKED BY PER CAPITA AMOUNT
(amounts in millions)
Per Capita Share of
County RDT&E Production Service Total Amount CA Total
Santa Clara $2,126,018 $1,824,498 $601,600 $4,552,116 $3,272.78 15.1%
Santa Barbara 336.733 237.749 220.899 795.381 2,412.44 2.6
Los Angeles 2,025.174 12,315.686 1,145.232 15,486.092 1,929.06 51.2
Orange 739.766 1,892.167 313.091 2,945.024 1,395.35 9.7
Solano 0.0 230.970 87.310 318.280 1,174.46 1.1
San Diego 648.246 839.822 732.026 2,220.094 1,055.93 7.3
Alameda 75.490 61.232 917.785 1,054.507 888.38 3.5
Ventura 56.860 226.806 121.163 404.829 681.19 1.3
San Francisco 6.291 255.423 118.309 380.023 523.74 1.3
San Bernardino 131.500 124.640 285.276 541.416 509.47 1.8
Lassen 1.162 0.339 10.691 12.192 499.67 0.0
Sacramento 77.830 248.198 97.785 423.813 479.59 1.4
Kern 20.679 49.866 125.794 196.339 415.88 0.6
San Mateo 73.400 121.588 34.671 229.659 373.98 0.8
Monterey 0.390 7.185 102.186 109.761 337.83 0.4
Kings 0.0 20.643 6.720 27.363 326.92 0.1
Contra Costa 2.145 197.509 22.625 222.279 312.37 0.7
San Benito 0.168 8.331 0.0 8.499 285.20 0.0
Yuba 0.0 1.148 9.497 10.645 198.97 0.0
Yolo 1.359 15.868 4.828 22.055 179.89 0.1
Del Norte 0.0 0.0 2.860 2.860 153.76 0.0
Merced 0.0 0.511 23.511 24.022 152.42 0.1
Sonoma 0.713 42.399 3.384 46.496 140.09 0.2
San Luis Obispo 0.0 20.800 2.145 22.945 124.23 0.1
Glenn 0.0 0.202 2.300 2.502 109.26 0.0
Tulare 0.0 23.823 0.129 23.952 86.56 0.1
Imperial 0.240 0.468 7.909 8.617 82.62 0.0
Riverside 3.226 25.013 30.830 59.069 73.75 0.2
Humboldt 0.124 0.709 6.845 7.678 68.31 0.0
San Joaquin 0.0 6.487 17.352 23.839 58.44 0.1
Stanislaus 0.0 13.193 3.692 16.885 56.13 0.1
Amador 0.0 0.828 0.0 0.828 36.03 0.0
Mono 0.0 0.0 0.289 0.289 31.41 0.0
Marin 0.037 0.881 5.008 5.926 26.20 0.0
Santa Cms 0.494 4.415 0.0 4.909 23.34 0.0
Nevada 0.0 0.602 0.785 1.387 20.79 0.0
Shasta 0.180 1.600 0.845 2.625 20.25 0.0
Tuolumne 0.0 0.0 0.518 0.518 13.05 0.0
Mariposa 0.076 0.061 0.029 0.166 12.67 0.0
Placer 0.050 1.586 0.044 1.680 12.32 0.0
Mendocino 0.0 0.327 0.527 0.854 11.71 0.0
Siskiyou 0.100 0.243 0.046 0.389 9.15 0.0
Colusa 0.0 o:o 0.125 0.125 8.62 0.0
Fresno 0.215 0.677 3.737 4.629 8.11 0.0
Napa 0.0 0.659 0.163 0.822 7.94 0.0
Tehama 0.0 0.343 0.0 0.343 7.83 0.0
Modoc 0.0 0.065 0.0 0.065 6.77 0.0
Butte 0.0 0.461 0.195 0.656 4.06 0.0
Inyo 0.0 0.074 0.0 0.074 4.02 0.0
El Dorado 0.0 0.352 0.033 0.385 3.77 0.0
Lake 0.0 0.169 0.0 0.169 3.59 0.0
Madera 0.0 0.243 0.0 0.243 3.24 0.0
Calaveras 0.0 0.073 0.0 0.073 2.77 0.0
Sutter 0.045 -0.417 0.057 -0.315 -57.80 0.0
State Total $6,328,711 $18,826,515 $5,070,846 $30,226,072 $1,160.68 100.0%
Source: Data Resources, Inc.
Source: [Ref. 3:p. 38]
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state awards. Santa Clara County, however, did have the
largest amount of RDT&E prime contract spending in the state
with $2.1 billion in FY 1985. [Ref. 3:pp. 37-39]
E. SUMMARY
In summary, DOD spending accounts for 9.3 percent of the
state's total private output on the average. Certain
segments of industry receive a higher concentration of
defense expenditures; they include the aerospace,
communications and electrical equipment and electronics
components industries. Among the states, California ranks
first if measured by dollar value of prime contracts awarded
and fourth on a per capita basis. Research by the state of
California on defense spending trends suggests that defense
expenditures have been a significant component of
California's economy for the last 25 years.
In conclusion, it is obvious that the Commission on
State Finance is proud of their work on the report, Impact
of Federal Expenditures in California . The Commission
freely distributes the report to any one who asks for it.
Given that it is possibly the only report of its kind
produced by any of the 50 states, it provides a wealth of
information about federal defense expenditures in California
and their impact on the state's economy. In particular,
information, like that presented in Table V-2 , which
establishes the percentage of defense-related output to
total state output, is a valuable indication of the
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importance of defense spending in each state. Establishing
some indication of the importance of defense spending in
each state may also establish the importance of proficiency
in defense political gamesmanship—in particular, the
importance of the ability to influence increased





1. The Elements of Defense Politics
One of the most recognizable elements of defense
politics is the "military-industrial complex." The term,
"military-industria complex," was coined by President
Eisenhower in his farewell address to the Nation in 1961
[Ref. 6:p. 797]. Because President Eisenhower warned
against its potential misplaced power, the "military-
industrial complex" has been carefully studied with a
sometimes suspicious and accusatory eye by politicians,
journalists, scholars and the like. The generally held
notion about the "military-industrial complex" was simply
that military men and businessmen had a vested interest in
perpetuating the production of the instruments of war; and
they would do so to the point of ignoring the alternatives.
The alternatives that would be overlooked ranged from
something like producing technically simple, standardized
weapons, perhaps, as effective, but not as profitable or as
state-of-the-art as new systems, to providing less than
enthusiastic support for peace initiatives.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the "military-





industrial complex." Again, the premise is the same:
businesses and government, particularly a Congress well-
connected to defense-related constituencies, work together
to serve their own interests by keeping defense spending
high. The "congressional-industrial complex" is viewed with
no less suspicion than the "military-industrial complex";
its power is presumably kept in check because of the
presence of its "watchdogs" in journalism, politics and
academics.
The actual measurement of the influence or power of
the "military-industrial complex" and/or the "congressional-
industrial complex" is difficult, if not impossible, to
accomplish. The generally held belief is that the
"military-industrial complex" and the "congressional-
industrial complex" wield a great deal of influence in the
amount and location of defense expenditures for various
weapon systems; however, as evidenced in Chapter II, much of
the scholarly empirical studies find little support for this
viewpoint. And yet, the power and influence with which
defense politics are credited has not waned.
The "military-industrial complex" and the
"congressional-industrial complex" have been active elements
of defense politics during the Reagan Administration; the
six case studies presented in Chapter III illustrate this
point. However, it would appear that the negative
connotations of the terms, "military-industrial complex" and
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"congressional-industrial complex," are not always deserved.
As the cases show, in some instances, as in the C-5B
transport aircraft, the defense political influences
produced a better weapon system choice. Additionally, the
influence of defense politics may assist in making choices
that are neither "good" nor "bad" but simply "made," as in
the case of the B-1B bomber.
2 . California and the Elements of Defense Politics
In general, the part that defense politics have
played in bringing more defense dollars to California during
the Reagan Administration is hard to define given the
immensity of defense expenditures in the state both before
and after the rearmament plan was initiated. To reiterate
some of the findings in Chapter IV, recall that California
has been awarded more dollars in defense prime contracts
than any other state; since the 1960s California has
received 15 to 20 percent of all DOD prime contracts awarded
in the United States. Since 1980 California has
consistently been awarded at least 19 percent of the prime
contracts, followed by Texas or New York with less than nine
percent each. California was number one in at least eight
of the 2 5 procurement categories reported in the DIOR
reports, Department of Defense Prime Contract Awards by
Region and State , since 1980; and it has held a place in the
top five states in at least 17 of the same 2 5 procurement
categories.
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No other state can come close to California in
regard to its receipt of DOD prime contract awards. Some of
the reasons that California outstrips the other states would
appear to lie in a defense political framework. At the end
of Chapter II a few questions were put forth that hinted at
the potential influence that defense politics could have in
the expenditure of defense dollars in California during the
Reagan Administration. First, as the former Assistant
Secretary of Defense, Charles J. Hitch, suggested, are
defense procurement dollars spent in geographic locations
where the industries are located? Given that at least two,
and most times three, of the top five defense contractors in
the United States from FY 1982 to FY 1986 were also among
the top five defense contractors working in California,
there would appear to be some truth to the suggestion—where
the industries are located, the dollars are spent.
Secondly, has the impact of direct military presence in the
districts of the House representatives been more or less
ambiguous during this FY 1980 to FY 1986 time frame? The
considerable "presence" of military personnel in California
is undeniable. California has more active duty military
personnel and DOD-employed civilians than any other state;
the compensation to these individuals is also greater than
that for any state. Clearly, representatives from
California must consider this military presence in their
actions. And, finally, are the House and Senate Armed
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Services Committees and Appropriations Committees made up of
members from districts with a large defense contract
constituency-oriented membership? One of the two senators
from California, Republican Pete Wilson, has been on the
Senate Armed Services Committee since 1983. Of the 45
congressmen from California, eight of them were serving on
either the House Armed Services Committee or the Appropria-
tions Committee in 1986. Of the eight representatives, it
is interesting that four of them served the two cities where
in FY 1986 the greatest dollar values of prime contracts
were awarded: Los Angeles and San Diego. Three others of
the eight had within their districts military bases that
rank among the top ten in numbers of personnel stationed in
California at individual bases—McClellan AFB, Twentynine
Palms MCAGCC and El Toro MCAS.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS OF AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Obviously, not all of the questions posed at the end of
Chapter II have been answered in this thesis. Three of the
questions were linked in the preceding section to trends in
defense expenditures during the Reagan Administration, but
the rest remain unanswered and are prime candidates for
further research in this area. They, again, are:
1. Is the prosperity of the nation, in particular
California, dependent on the might of the "military-
industrial complex" as Cook suggests?
2. Do the shifts in strategic plans and the ever-changing
international situation dictate the product mix of
defense procurement?
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3. Does the "military-industrial complex" hinder arms
control, as denied by Charles Wolf, Jr.?
4. Have the "follow-on" and the "bail-out" imperatives,
as developed by Kurth, been operating during the
Reagan Administration?
5. Have the votes of the senior members of Congress
correlated to concentrations of defense spending
during the Reagan Administration as Cobb found in
earlier years?
6. Has there been an institutional push towards partisan
voting on defense procurement issues during the Reagan
Administration, as Davidson and Oleszek suggest?
In addition to these questions, it would be interesting
to expand this thesis from the context of a case study on
California to a study of all states, as was the original
intent of this thesis. To incorporate all the states in a
study, the DRI U.S. Macro Model, that was used by the State
of California's Commission on State Finance, would have to
be used with each state's own econometric model to provide
output estimates for analysis.
Alternatively, the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering, Office of Industrial
Base Assessment, has developed the DEIMS (Defense Economic
Impact Modeling System) model which is used by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense's Office of Program Analysis and
Evaluation to estimate defense spending that may occur in
each of the 50 states during future calendar years. The
product of this model is the report published yearly by
DIOR, previously titled Estimated Defense Expenditures for
States . The most recent report has been renamed Projected
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Defense Purchases Detailed by Industry and State Calendar
Years 1986-1991 . This report estimates defense spending in
each state on the basis of the President's budget
submission. The potential dollar expenditures are shredded
out, program by program, and placed into the industries
where the production, research and development efforts, or
the like, will take place. Then, based on the geographic
distribution of the major components of defense spending in
the recent past, the defense spending estimates for each
state are developed in total and, in particular, defense
spending estimates are made for the largest industry sectors
in the state. [Ref. 61:p. 1] This report, if coupled with
information about the share of a state's industrial base
taken up by defense work, points to the importance of
influencing defense expenditures in the state.
C. THE CONCLUSION
Has California benefited more than any other state from
the Reagan Administration's military buildup? Folklore says
it has, but the facts seem to counter this belief. While
during FY 1981 through FY 1984 California did receive the
largest dollar value increases in contract awards of any
state, the percentage change represented by these dollar
values was not among the largest percentage changes in
awards to the fifty states. It is essential to consider the
changes in the context of the immensity of the awards given
to California for an adeguate comparison.
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The fact that the State of California is interested
enough in federal expenditures to produce a report, Impact
of Federal Expenditures on California . indicates the
importance that these expenditures have in relation to the
state's economy. However, this interest is not a product of
the Reagan Administration's military buildup. As the report
states, since the 1960s, the state has received 15 to 20
percent of all DOD prime contracts; the 19 percent average
figure for FY 1980-1986 is, therefore, right in line. [Ref.
3:p. 20] Additionally, the state is quick to point out that
defense spending in California accounted for only 9.3
percent of total private output in the state in 198 6 and
that only 16.3 percent of manufacturing output was defense-
related. While changes in defense expenditures could affect
some manufacturing industries dependent upon defense
spending more than others, relatively modest effects would
be evidenced in "aggregate" growth rates, such as employment
and revenue growth. [Ref. 3: pp. 3 0-3 2]
The fact of the matter is that California's huge
infrastructure of defense industries and non-defense
industries is so large that, all other considerations of the
elements of defense politics aside, the state is a natural
candidate for and recipient of defense expenditures in times
of both austere and abundant defense funding.
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